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I. Once More into the Breach 
The mistake, the weakness at any rate, is perhaps to want to know what one is 
talking about. In defining literature to one's satisfaction, even brief, where is the 
gain, even brief? Armor, all that stuff, for a loathsome combat. – Samuel 
Beckett, Letter to Georges Duthuit, 1948 
 
 Considering Beckett's low opinion of criticism, it is not only ironic that so much critical 
literature has been produced on Beckett's plays and fiction, but also inevitable that the majority of that 
criticism is almost useless in offering readers a useful lens through which to view Beckett's work. If the 
typical critical impulses are to complicate, to reveal hidden connections, to make parallels between a 
work and its context, historical or philosophical, and to ultimately comprehend literature by bestowing 
upon it a dominant meaning or theme, then Beckett renders such tactics useless in advance, like a 
general who knows the other army's moves before it makes them. The problem is not that Beckett's 
texts lack meaning, but rather that they are supersaturated with meaning, containing parallels to so 
many different critical and philosophical traditions that whenever a critic highlights a single example of 
one of those parallels and then claims it as Beckett's true stance, the key to unlocking it all, they only 
end up demonstrating their susceptibility to confirmation bias, selecting the parts of the text that best 
suit their argument while ignoring the rest, unable to cast off their “loathsome armor.” 
 To avoid ascribing to Beckett any endorsement of that which he represents, my focus will be 
primarily on the form of Beckett's first five novels, Murphy (written mid-1930s), Watt (written early-
1940s), Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable (written late-1940s), because form is more value-
neutral than content, not a position but rather the shape a position takes. One can argue forever about 
whether or not Beckett is an existentialist, post-structuralist, etc., but it is much more difficult to 
misinterpret whether a book has chapters or not, for example. To begin with, then, my questions will be 
of the following type: Why is Murphy 13 chapters? Why is Watt four sections and an appenda? Why is 
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Molloy in two parts but Malone Dies and The Unnamable both consist of a single unbroken section? 
How does language gain meaning in these novels? Does that mechanism change at any point? Are any 
of the novels linked by a linear process, meaning that they need to be read in a specific order? If so, 
which novels, and what is that process? 
 Before moving on to those questions, I'd like to first use Hugh Kenner as an example of how 
traditional critical practices fail in reference to Beckett. In 1958, Kenner went to France to interview 
Samuel Beckett about Beckett's work, a rare opportunity given Beckett's famous reticence. As Kenner 
describes it in the introduction to his Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study, Kenner went into the interview 
with a grand conception of Beckett's novels as containing “some hidden plan or key like the parallels in 
Ulysses,” (1) but Beckett quickly dismissed this approach, suggesting that “overinterpretation” was 
more of a danger than misinterpretation, and that such a notion of literature falsely assumes that authors 
are writing “in order to affirm some general truth” (3). Hilariously, despite this rebuke, the reader finds 
Kenner proposing late in the first chapter that Beckett's Three Novels re-enact “a sardonic counterpoint 
to the epic tradition,” (63) with Molloy as first Molloy's Odyssey, complete with Lousse as Calypso and 
a policeman as Polyphemus, then Moran as The Aeneid, Malone Dies as a recapitulation of Dante's 
Commedia, and with The Unnamable moving from the classic tradition to the beginning of the modern 
by carrying “the Cartesian process backwards, beginning with a bodily je suis and ending with a bare 
cogito” (128). 
 While thankfully Kenner's proposals in regards to possible correspondences between Beckett's 
Three Novels and The Odyssey, etc., were not taken up by most of the critical community, the linking of 
Beckett and Descartes, due at least in part though not entirely to Kenner, was a common practice in 
subsequent Beckett criticism, so much so that Anthony Ullman describes the application of Descartes 
to Beckett as “the great commonplace of Beckett studies” (Beckett and Poststructuralism 158). Beckett 
has also been claimed as, in the 70s, either an existential humanist who ultimately affirms existence 
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(emphasis on the “I'll go on” in The Unnamable's closing “you can't go on, I must go on, I'll go on”) or 
a Schopenhauerian pessimist who denies all value except the transient solace of art (emphasis on the 
“you can't go on”), with the 80s moving on to a post-structuralist focus on how Beckett exposes the 
inevitable slippages of language (emphasis on the co-existence of the “you” and “I” to refer to what is 
ostensibly the same speaker). Following the wealth of new information on Beckett's personal 
engagement with philosophy brought to light by James Knowlson's landmark 1996 biography Damned 
To Fame, which made available to scholars decades worth of notes and letters written by Beckett, 
Beckett studies took what Matthew Feldman describes in his 2015 Falsifying Beckett as “the archival 
turn,” (19) with Feldman himself arguing for the relevancy of phenomenology to Beckett's novels 
based on Beckett's reading of Sartre's 1936 The Imagination, in which Sartre provides an exegesis of 
Husserl, and the subsequent appearance in Watt of what Feldman calls “the phenomenological 
rendering of intellection ... [and] the vexed relation for a conscious subject depicting objects as they are 
perceived” (258). 
 Although I would disagree with the idea that Beckett endorses existentialism or any other -ism, 
it would also be wrong to contend that philosophy has no relevance to Beckett, as his work makes 
constant reference to philosophers and their ideas, such as, to choose just a few examples, the 
description of Murphy's Occasionalist-like mind as a “large hollow sphere, hermetically closed to the 
universe without,” (Murphy 65) Molloy's invocation of “the image of old Geulincx, dead young,” 
(Three Novels 46) or Malone's memory of a parrot's mangling of the famous Aquinas maxim “Nihil in 
intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu” (“Nothing is in the intellect that is not first in the senses”) with 
the parrot only able to repeat the opening “Nihil in intellectu,” (Three Novels 212) an aposiopesis that 
undermines the empirical certainty of the original phrase. Overall, the problem is that, as 
phenomenology expert Dermot Moran describes in his article “Beckett and Philosophy,” Beckett is “the 
most philosophical of twentieth-century writers,” (93) but “overemphasizing the supposed 
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philosophical message ... tends to downplay the extraordinary humor and anarchic subversion of any 
overarching fixed meaning” (103) found therein. Beckett does not endorse existentialism or post-
structuralism; he satirizes them. Although the texts might at times appear to endorse or resemble a 
specific position, that position is always nullified by the subsequent inclusion of its antithesis in a 
“humorous deflationary counterpoint” (Moran, “Beckett and Philosophy” 94) that leaves only 
paradoxes, fragments of ideas, or, as Molloy says, “points of detail instead of ... the essence of the 
system,” (Beckett, Three Novels 20) because for Beckett there is no system, only a “kind of arbitrary 
collection or bricolage of philosophical ideas” (Moran, “Beckett and Philosophy” 93). 
 While Beckett never endorses philosophy, he must still inhabit it to destroy it from the inside, 
and I argue in this paper that each of his first five novels has a specific philosophical target that is being 
satirized, a target revealed by each novel's form. In outlining the contours of these targets, I might 
appear to be “defining literature,” but one has to at least know the subject of a joke in order to laugh in 
the right spots, and my argument is that the focus of Beckett's satire changes across novels, rather than 
that Beckett's actual belief system changes, as he consistently has none. In response to Ulrika Maude 
and Matthew Feldman's introduction to 2009's Beckett and Phenomenology in which they lament that 
while phenomenology “bear[s] substantial relevance to Beckett's work,” such “phenomenological 
approaches have been few and far between,” (2) I will argue that the Three Novels can be best 
understood as a satire of phenomenology, with the phylogeny of Molloy, Malone Dies, and The 
Unnamable's structural progression recapitulating the ontogeny of Husserl's method only to highlight 
that method's inadequacies. 
 To make that argument, this paper consists of four main sections. Since my claim hinges on the 
belief that Beckett repudiates any philosophical stance, I begin by drawing from several interviews and 
letters to demonstrate that Beckett's overall attitude toward philosophy is one of skepticism. This 
immediately brings up the problem of whether skepticism also qualifies as a position, with the denial of 
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affirmation itself an affirmation of denial, and I accommodate this paradox, and account for the 
difficulty involved in Beckett referring to philosophical positions without assuming them, by arguing 
that Beckett's novels can only be understood as a satire, a reductio ad absurdum argument against any 
stance they temporarily inhabit. To provide both a working concept of satire and an initial paradigm 
through which to view Beckett's early novels as a whole, I end the first section by applying Mikhail 
Bakhtin's conception of satire from Rabelais and His World to Beckett's pentalogy.  
 In the second section, I look at Murphy and Watt through the lens of the rational tradition, 
linking Murphy to the Occasionalism of Descartes and Arnold Geulincx, and, after arguing that the 
repressive logicism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is the culmination of Descartes' mathematical impulses, 
connecting Watt to early Wittgenstein.1 While the well-worn ground of the parallels between Descartes 
and Beckett's work is not my main focus, and in fact I am arguing that such an approach is inadequate 
to the complexities of the Three Novels, it is necessary to show how Beckett began by destroying the 
past tradition before I can show how he then moved on to demolishing contemporary philosophy once 
he began writing in French in 1946. Also, I believe that in each of the five novels the structure is 
determined by the philosophical target, but this is more readily apparent in both Murphy and Watt, so 
examining them before turning to the Three Novels offers convincing evidence that the Three Novels 
employ a similar strategy. 
 In the third and main section, I draw from Matthew Feldman's recent archival work to argue that 
Beckett's post-war fiction had phenomenology in its crosshairs rather than Descartes, and that this helps 
explain the linear process that begins in Molloy and shudders to a halt in The Unnamable. In particular, 
I account for the problematic simultaneity of the Molloy and Moran sections in the first novel through 
reference to Eugen Fink's conception of the phenomenological process as requiring an initial step of 
                                                 
1 This does not apply to the later Wittgenstein, because the Philosophical Investigations is in my opinion mainly an 
attempt to exorcise Descartes from his ideas, which leads him to reject both the theory of consciousness as depiction and 
the possibility of language having a solely logical foundation. 
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two concurrent actions, the bracketing of the world and the reduction of experience to phenomena. I 
then argue that Malone's stories about his proxy figure Sapo represent a failed attempt at eidetic 
variation (the search for essential qualities through the imaginative variation of components), before 
highlighting the many generative parallels between The Unnamable and Husserl's argument in Chapter 
49 of Ideas 1 that consciousness, described in a later section as “in and for itself indescribable,” (154) 
could survive a “nullifying of the world of things” (89). 
 One of the main benefits of my description of Beckett's novels as a parody of phenomenology is 
that such a view also accounts for the many congruencies between Beckett's fiction and post-
structuralism, in that the reasons for the failure of the phenomenological method as parodied by the 
Three Novels (and why those novels satirize phenomenology rather than embrace it) is that the 
phenomenological voice as medium of consciousness can only present itself through the exterior 
slippages of language, and its presentation can therefore never reach any essential presence. To end this 
section, I show how, concurrent to the Three Novels' recapitulation of the phenomenological process, 
the attendant critiques of that process which highlight its numerous failures resemble the evolution of 
Derrida's own critiques of Husserl from 1953's The Problem of Origin in Husserl to 1967's Voice and 
Phenomenon.  
 In the fourth and final section, I examine how the structure of each novel is determined by its 
philosophical object of parody, then compare the most distinctive linguistic features of each of the five 
novels to demonstrate how their differences correspond to the switch from a focus on Descartes to 
Husserl, with Murphy attempting a Cartesian one-to-one correspondence that reveals essential 
meaning, Watt seeking to force the synchronization of world and language through the imperial logic of 
the system, and the Three Novels being forced, in the absence of essential or logical meaning, to rely 
solely on repetition, with the rate of frequency for that repetition increasing exponentially at the end of 
The Unnamable as indication of that repetition's ultimate failure to provide any stable foundation for 
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meaning. While it is impossible to entirely avoid thematic analysis (form is content, content form, after 
all) and therefore unavoidable that I engage at least in part in the “combat” Beckett so loathed, I would 
stress as a final note before proceeding that my emphasis will at least be on using thematic content to 
understand form rather than the more common opposite approach, and I hope as a result to fail better in 
my efforts than some of those who have failed before me. 
II. Terms of Engagement 
Interviewer: Have contemporary philosophers had any influence on your 
thought? 
Beckett: I never read philosophers. 
Interviewer: Why not? 
Beckett: I never understand anything they write. 
Interviewer: All the same, people have wondered if the existentialists' problem 
of being may afford a key to your works. 
Beckett: There's no key or problem. I wouldn't have had any reason to write 
my novels if I could have expressed their principles in philosophic terms. – 
Samuel Beckett Interview, 1961  
  
 It is quotes like the above that lead me to found this study on the belief that Beckett and his 
novels do not assume any specific philosophical position, but only parodically inhabit them to reveal 
their contradictions. Whenever asked, Beckett consistently maintained this rejection of any ultimate 
statement or allegorical intent throughout his life, so there is no reason to suspect him of a Duchamp-
like duplicity here, and it is illuminating to quote the rest of Beckett's response: 
One cannot speak anymore of being, one must speak only of the mess. 
When Heidegger and Sartre speak of a contrast between being and 
existence, they may be right, I don't know, but their language is too 
philosophical for me. I am not a philosopher. One can only speak of what 
is in front of him, and that now is simply the mess. (as quoted, Feldman, 
Falsifying Beckett 75) 
 
For someone claiming ignorance of philosophy, Beckett's reference to Heidegger and Sartre's notion of 
the difference between being and existence shows that he knew more than he was letting on, and 
Matthew Feldman has used Beckett's journals and notes to demonstrate that Beckett was rejecting 
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philosophy from a position of “learned ignorance” (Falsifying Beckett 77) after an intense engagement 
with the Western tradition that spanned from 1928 to 1938. According to Feldman, from 1928-32 
Beckett showed an initial interest in Descartes before moving on to Schopenhauer, taking extensive 
notes on the pessimistic The World as Will and Representation. Beckett's reading from 1932-36 moved 
away from direct sources to large-scale historical surveys, especially Wilhelm Windelband's 1901 A 
History of Philosophy, with Beckett paying closest attention to Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, and displaying 
a consistent interest in problems surrounding the subject/object relationship (Feldman, Falsifying 
Beckett 79). Beckett's notebooks also reflect a strong focus on the pre-Socratics, with more than half of 
the entries taken up by anecdotes of their paradoxes and sophistries (Feldman, Falsifying Beckett 132). 
From 1936 to 1938, Beckett moved back to direct sources, going to Trinity University to read the 
Ethics of obscure Occasionalist Arnold Geulincx before moving on to the contemporary linguistic 
philosophy of Fritz Mauthner's Contributions to a Critique of Language, which problematizes 
language's ability to represent the world because in the Kantian view “human concepts are always 
attached to pictorial ideas” and as a result our language and thinking can never capture the thing-in-
itself, are only “metaphorical” (as quoted, Feldman, Falsifying Beckett 82). Beckett's “struggle with 
philosophy” (Feldman, Falsifying Beckett 83) then concludes2 with a reading of Sartre’s 1936 The 
Imagination, where Sartre offers phenomenology as a solution to this problem of representation, and to 
which I will return to in the section on the Three Novels. 
 In taking these notes, particularly those on the pre-Socratics, Beckett shows that he is looking 
not for any solutions offered by philosophy, but for the most spectacular examples of philosophy's 
failures. Beckett wrote in his “German Diary” in 1937 that while reading Windelband and other 
sources, he was most interested not in gaining any summary comprehension of philosophical ideas but 
                                                 
2 This is not to indicate that Beckett stopped reading philosophy because he felt as if he had resolved any issues at this 
point, but more that he felt reading philosophy was no longer of use to him. 
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rather in gathering the anecdotal, the “straws, flotsam, etc. names, dates, births and deaths' of specific, 
individual lives” (as quoted, Feldman, Falsifying Beckett 199). Lacking any actual belief in philosophy, 
Beckett takes an ironic joy in the most extreme philosophical positions, positions whose absurdities 
argue against their own validity, such as the paradoxical sophistries of Protogoras and Heraclitus, or 
Berkeley's idealistic “Esse est percipere” (“To be is to be perceived”). In 1956 Beckett described his 
method for gleaning in the following terms: 
I take no sides. I am interested in the shape of ideas. There is a wonderful 
sentence in Augustine: 'Do not despair, one of the thieves was saved. Do not 
presume, one of the thieves was damned.' That sentence has a wonderful 
shape. It is the shape that matters. (as quoted, Tucker 17) 
 
 This desire for a self-annulling “wonderful shape,” rather than any focus on the content of the 
phrase, helps explain Beckett's consistent appreciation for and employment of paradox. The only 
philosophical “keys” to his work are paradoxical phrases that acknowledge their own limits, as Beckett 
provided in a 1967 letter: 
If I were in the unenviable position of having to study my work, my points of 
departure would be the 'Naught is more real  ...' and 'Ubi nihil vales  ...' both 
already in Murphy and neither very rational. (as quoted, Tucker 39)  
 
The full quotes referenced here are from Democritus (“Nothing is more real than nothing”) 
and Arnold Geulincx (“Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis” or “Where you are worth nothing, there 
you should want nothing”), and the fact that Beckett refers in 1967 to quotes found in his first 
novel suggest that his attitude changed little over the intervening period of time. Even on first 
glance, it is obvious that the chiasmus of these phrases seems to cancel out any resultant 
meaning. That initial impression is only strengthened when analyzing the theme and context 
of these phrases. Geulincx will be covered more in the next section, but the basic thrust of his 
saying is that when one does not fully understand, one should not act. Since Geulincx was an 
Occasionalist who believed that only God fully understood and was responsible for all action, 
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in every occasion one is “worth nothing” and to act ethically one should therefore 
continuously recognize their own ignorance and “want nothing.” 
 This paradoxical embrace of abstention leads to the Democritus quote, which is in 
response to Zeno's logical quandaries. Zeno argued that physical movement was impossible, 
since movement would require empty space to move into, a void or nothingness. According to 
the sophist logic of Zeno and Parmenides, a “nothing” cannot exist, because if it exists then it 
is a “something,” and therefore motion is impossible, despite our experience of it, since the 
void motion requires is also impossible. Democritus' retort is willing to affirm the paradoxical 
“somethingness” of nothingness which Zeno's logic denied, responding that “nothing is more 
real than nothing” because motion occurs, but this should not be taken as indicating some 
pragmatic embrace of experience or empirical certainty, as Democritus also denies the 
validity of perception due to his belief in an atomistic universe in which all matter consists of 
smaller parts that cannot be perceived by humans. So if Democritus rejects both logic and 
experience, what is left to embrace?  
 This brings up the question of whether Beckett's position is best described as closest to 
the ancient Greek school of Skepticism, and whether his denial of a position is itself a 
position, with my answer being no on both counts. While Beckett and the Skeptic pre-
Socratics would both seem to deny the possibility of certain knowledge, the intended result of 
that denial for the Skeptics was the tranquility of ataraxia. Since Democritus offers a 
paradoxical response to a paradoxical response, however, and seeks to destroy tranquility 
rather than reinforce it, I would argue that this self-reflexive form of skepticism does not 
qualify as a position, as it is skeptical even of skepticism, and it is this exponential form of 
doubt, a doubt that doubts itself, that Beckett also employs. It's not the case with Beckett that 
one at least knows that one does not know, as even that certainty is undermined, left uncertain 
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rather than definitively rejected. This is best demonstrated in Molloy, when Molloy says that  
to know nothing is nothing, not to want to know anything likewise, but to be 
beyond knowing anything, to know you are beyond knowing anything, that is 
when peace enters in, to the soul of the incurious seeker. It is then the true 
division begins, of twenty-two by seven, for example, and the pages fill with 
the true ciphers at last. But I would rather not affirm anything on this subject. 
(Beckett, Three Novels 58) 
 
It is key here that while Molloy references ataraxia as a desirable state, it is one that he does not 
personally possess, one that he longs for but cannot affirm as his narrative moves constantly forward, 
just as he could not reach the endpoint of dividing twenty-two by seven. While of course logically one 
can always protest that the embrace of abstention is still an embrace, this is the precise type of logic 
that Democritus and Beckett are attempting to reject, and much of the appeal of Beckett's fiction lies in 
the monomaniacal effort expended to erase the ever-changing trace of residual positionality that such 
logic imposes, a process that could be likened to watching someone attempt to clean their hands with 
dirty soap. Rather than the peace of abstaining, Beckett constantly fights to negate his current position, 
then negate the implicit affirmation hidden within that negation, then negate that negation, ad infinitum.  
The goal is to abstain from abstaining, to not choose without choosing to not choose, an impossible 
task, hence the constant emphasis on failure throughout his oeuvre, and why I wouldn't class Beckett 
with the Skeptics, despite their many coterminous points. Mistaking skepticism for a position in 
Beckett is to interrupt the prisoner mid-escape attempt and declare the prison his or her true home.  
 To reject both the senses and the mind, to reject even rejection itself, is an absurd situation, 
enough to make someone laugh or cry, right? The classical tradition would agree, as while currently 
Democritus is associated primarily with atomism, for most of Western history, especially in 
Renaissance art, Democritus was known as the laughing philosopher, often paired with Heraclitus, 
known as the weeping philosopher. This view of Democritus as the epitome of the mocking spirit offers 
a final perspective on the problem of Beckett's own views on philosophy. Any positive philosophical 
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claim that seeks to resolve the problems of the subject/object relationship is always met by Beckett 
with mockery, and that mockery is the only absolute, the only position one could possibly force upon 
Beckett, because it least resembles the vulnerable affirmation of a typical stance. If the prison of a 
position is inescapable, then the mocker at least never stops attacking their cage, whereas the goal of 
ataraxia is to learn how to sing in one's chains like the sea. Finally, I'd offer that I do recognize the 
logical impossibility of my argument here, and that rationally the position of Beckett's satirical 
skepticism qualifies a position, but I'd also argue that both sides of this coin are inadequate, that a non-
positional skepticism is a paradox, but also that to define skepticism as an affirmation of negation is to 
misconstrue it according to its own terms, to confuse the negative method of doubting with the positive 
end results of that process. Given these two unsatisfactory choices, I'm choosing to go with the option 
also embraced by the texts and author, both of which clearly display an appreciation for paradox, 
making postionality the problem rather than the solution.  
 Since my views on Beckett's lack of a position eliminate the possible adequacy of any one 
philosophical perspective in offering a synoptic view, I'd like to now use the notion of Democritus as 
the laughing philosopher to propose a different paradigm by which to approach Beckett's early novels 
as a whole, that of satire. In Rabelais and His World (written 1940, published 1965), Mikhail Bakhtin 
proposes that Rabelaisian Medieval satire is best understood as accomplishing the subversion of 
dominant hierarchies through the laughing embrace of the ever-changing grotesque. In opposition to 
state-sponsored official feasts, which consecrate “all that is stable, unchanging  ... the triumph of a truth 
already established” and are “monolithically serious,” (Bakhtin 9) Rabelais celebrates the spirit of the 
carnival, which takes place outside of the consecrated space, and is “the feast of becoming, change and 
renewal  ... hostile to all that was immortalized and completed” (Bakhtin 10). The rituals of the carnival 
are based on the universality of laughter, which frees participants “from all religious and ecclesiastic 
dogmatism, from all mysticism and piety” (Bakhtin 7). This laughter destroys individual values and 
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boundaries to become “the laughter of all people  ... universal in scope” (Bakhtin 11). Importantly in 
relation to Democritus' self-reflexive mockery, carnival laughter is “also directed at those who laugh,” 
(Bakhtin 12) a laughter that destroys and renews simultaneously and does not exempt itself in this 
process. Using the abusive speech of the market rather than the official, sanitized speech of the state or 
church, carnival laughter embraces profanity to celebrate the vulgar functions which are normally 
repressed, the bowels and genitals, highlighting what Bakhtin describes as the “grotesque realism of the 
body,” which is always “a phenomenon in transformation, an as yet unfinished metamorphosis” (24). 
This embrace of the “lower stratum of the body,” (Bakhtin 21) while “deeply positive,” results in the 
subversion of official forms, the “degradation  ... [and] lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, 
abstract  ... to the material level” (Bakhtin 19) of the earth and its ambivalent fertility which turns birth 
into death and death into life in a constant state of flux similar to Heraclitus. The grotesque body 
embraced through the carnival spirit is a force of renewal, no longer “separated from the rest of the 
world ... it is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits” (Bakhtin 26). 
 You might be thinking at this point that if I'm going to argue that Beckett's work acts as a 
positive embrace of the medieval grotesque body as a site of universal flux, then I will be directly 
contradicting my central stance that Beckett is apositional. However, while traces of this medieval form 
of satire appear occasionally, particularly in Molloy, it is not the type of satire Beckett most frequently 
employs. According to Bakhtin, Medieval satire, which functions as a positive embrace of the always-
ambivalent grotesque, has since been suppressed, starting in the Renaissance when notions of the 
vulgar nature of the carnivalesque body began to be replaced by the dogmatism of rationality, and the 
body was increasingly conceived of as a “completed, finished product ... isolated, alone” (29). Post-
Enlightenment that rationality and attendant individuality becomes even more dominant, and satire 
moves from celebrating humanity's universal physicality to expressing the bitterness of an isolated 
subject, “cut down to cold humor, irony, sarcasm,” (Bakhtin 38) with modern satire having “a solely 
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negative character ... deprived of regenerating ambivalence,” (Bakhtin 22) which is much closer to 
Beckett. The grotesque as divorced from the body can now only inspire terror, stemming from the 
Romantics, whose discovery of the always-changing “interior subjective man with his depth, 
complexity, and inexhaustible resources” (Bakhtin 44) led them to challenge “the cold rationalism ... 
[and] official, formalistic, and logical authoritarianism” of the Enlightenment's “narrow and artificial 
optimism” (Bakhtin 37). The positive aspect of satire is absent, however, as rather than participating in 
a celebration shared by all, the Romantic individual's isolation causes satirical laughter to become 
bitter, melancholic, shrinking in fear from a monstrous, alien world. Madness is no longer festive, “a 
gay parody of official reason,” but instead “acquires a somber, tragic aspect of individual isolation” 
(Bakhtin 39) and the mask, which in the carnival covers “the playful element of life,” now has behind it 
only “a terrible vacuum, a nothingness” (Bakhtin 40). Bakhtin ends by claiming that the Romantic 
grotesque was adopted by the modernists3 and then “evolved under the influence of existentialism,” 
(46) but that this evolution only increased the sense of isolated alienation, as “the gay and regenerating 
element” (51) of the true grotesque was still absent. 
 Bakhtin's thoughts on satire offer a division between the official hierarchy (rational, orderly, 
particular, clean, fixed) and the subversive force of satire (illogical, chaotic, universal, vulgar, always-
changing) which can be used as a general approach for all of Beckett's novels. Bakhtin says of Rabelais 
that his work has “a certain undestroyable nonofficial nature” with which “no dogma, no 
authoritarianism, no narrow-minded seriousness can coexist,” (3) and the same is true of Beckett. In 
cultural terms, Beckett's early novels, always featuring a comic Irish protagonist, could be read as the 
attack of Irishness against the dominant European order as represented by the English in Murphy 
(Murphy lives in London) or the French in the Three Novels, which not only were written in French but 
also have a first novel with two parts that contrast the Irish vulgarity of Molloy with Moran, the most 
                                                 
3 Alfred Jarry is the example given by Bakhtin. 
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French character in the series and the only one inclined toward “that most fruitful of dispositions, 
horror of the body and its functions” (Beckett, Three Novels 113). In terms of plot, any time a stable 
point is reached, that stability is always immediately undermined by an unforeseen, often vulgar 
occurrence, such as in Watt when a pages-long description of the absurdly intricate formal patterns by 
which five academics in a thesis hearing could look at each other in succession without repeating a step 
is interrupted by a “frankly revolting vapor arising from among the recesses of Mr. Magershon's body-
linen” (145). The ease with which the vulgarity of the body erases the intolerable officiousness of 
proceedings reveals the fragile absurdity of those unnecessary convolutions, the failure of their ability 
to repress the unfinished body through codification. Another example of an effort at systemization 
being abruptly abandoned in a manner which reveals the system's irrelevancy is when Molloy goes to 
great lengths to arrive at an order for sucking his stones, then ends by simply throwing the stones away.  
 Bakhtin's distinction between a regenerative laughter that affirms the universal body and a bitter 
laughter that only negates an alien world also helps with the problem of whether or not Beckett is an 
optimistic existential humanist or pessimistic Schopenhauerian, as I would argue that the pentalogy 
contains both types of humor, and therefore exhibits both optimistic and pessimistic tendencies, making 
it neither overall. Molloy in particular displays a disgusting vitality of the body that offers the most 
comic moments in the five novels, such as when a policeman asks Molloy for identification papers and 
Molloy confusedly presents the representative of law and order with the newspaper Molloy uses to 
wipe his rectum, or when Molloy worries that the only time he had sexual intercourse, he might have 
accidentally penetrated the woman's rectum, and therefore he cannot say he has ever known true love. 
Parallel to the increasing dissolution of the characters' bodies, breaking down from a limp to a crawl to 
a permanent stasis, the grotesque in the Three Novels increasingly shifts from comedy to horror, and 
The Unnamable, while still a satire, is the least comic of the novels under examination. Since the body 
is almost entirely absent by the series' end, the Unnamable lacks any connection outside of himself and 
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can only mock his own isolation as he repeatedly tries and fails to remove his own mask to reveal the 
vacuum underneath. 
 Finally, having seen how Bakhtin's binary applies to these novels as a whole, I'd like to briefly 
show how it applies to each novel on an individual basis. The basic terms of Murphy are that Murphy 
wants to retreat into the pure isolation of mind, but is always pulled back to the world by the urges of 
his body, particularly his sexual attraction to Celia, which undermines the validity of Murphy's 
solipsistic efforts. Watt, as already described above, consists mostly of lists that work through the 
logical possibilities of a situation in an attempt to understand it, only to then dissolve that 
understanding when a new possibility arises that destroys all progress. In what meager plot there is, the 
questioning nature of the main character (Watt/What?) is canceled out by the nullifying force of Mr. 
Knott (Not/Naught/Knot), which also indicates a general repudiation of official knowledge. Molloy 
juxtaposes Molloy, the most joyously disgusting of all Beckett's “M” characters, against Moran, the 
most sanctimonious and repressive. Malone Dies still displays the occasional reference to Malone's 
body with the attendant vulgar comedy, as when he interrupts tales of his surrogate figure Sapo to 
remind himself “to eat and excrete ... dish and pot, dish and pot, those are the poles,” (Beckett, Three 
Novels 179) but these mentions of the body, along with the humor, drain away as Malone approaches 
death and his corporeal being becomes increasingly irrelevant, a process Malone describes as “being 
given ... birth into death” with his feet “clear already of the great cunt of existence” (Beckett, Three 
Novels 276). The Unnamable can be read on the simplest terms as demonstrating the terror and 
alienation that occur when subjective consciousness is divorced from the material body and its link to 
the universal. Having offered these broad assessments, I will now turn to an examination of the 
differing philosophical targets of each novel's satire. 
III. Initial Skirmishes: Murphy and Watt 
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A. Murphy 
The problem was of little interest. Any solution would do. – Samuel Beckett, 
Murphy 
 
 In his first novel, Murphy, Beckett parodies both Descartes and modernism, with vision being 
the link between the two. For Descartes, knowledge is vision, clarity of sight, and modernist novels 
were written in the third-person, meaning that their subjects were seen rather than heard, even during 
interior monologues. In Murphy, Beckett challenges both Cartesian surety and the modernist epiphanic, 
showing the uselessness of both when there is nothing worth seeing. The world of Murphy is created 
according to the concepts of Descartes, particularly the separation of mind and body, but Murphy lacks 
the meaning-giving presence of God, and the resulting existence is therefore absurd, as are the 
modernist methods used to depict it. 
 Although he was famously Joyce's amanuensis, Beckett most clearly states his views on 
modernism, or what for him is just contemporary literary fiction, in Proust, his 1930 critical essay. 
Beckett's thoughts on Proust are decidedly idiosyncratic, more Beckettian than Proustian, and present 
in stark terms the impossible task of furthering the modernist tradition that faced a developing author in 
1930. The worldview in Proust is bleak even by Beckett's standards, with the individual helpless before 
unrelenting Time, which “has deformed us” (512). In Proust's definition of identity, each person is 
always changing and therefore radically discontinuous, a series of selves rather than a single self. 
Attainment or satisfaction for the individual then becomes impossible, because attainment requires “the 
identification of the subject with the object of his desire ... [and] the subject has died – perhaps many 
times – on the way” (Beckett, Proust 513). Trapped in this hopeless situation, in need of solace, one has 
only habit to deaden experience and memory to offer the illusion of a brief respite. True escape occurs 
in rare flashes through an epiphanic moment of involuntary memory, which “in its flame has consumed 
Habit and all its works, and in its brightness revealed what the mock reality of experience never can 
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and never will reveal – the real” (Beckett, Proust 523).” Rather than producing naturalist fiction with 
objective descriptions of empirical reality, which amounts to nothing but “worshipping the offal of 
experience… content to transcribe the surface, the facade, behind which the Idea is prisoner,” (Beckett, 
Proust 546) the modernist writer relies upon involuntary memory to purify his or her vision of the 
distorting force of the will, reaching not around but through subjectivity to grasp the noumenon. This 
revelation results in the merging of form and content, with “the one the concretion of the other,” 
(Beckett, Proust 547) the revelation of the thing incarnate rather than a description of the thing, 
allowing the modernist author to capture “the essential reality that is denied” (Beckett, Proust 544) to 
mundane existence and conventional fiction. To further the work of Proust and other modernists, one 
must, like them, become “pure Subject ... almost exempt from the impurity of will” and produce novels 
that have been “purified in the transcendental aperception that can capture the Model, the Idea, the 
Thing-in-itself” (Beckett, Proust 552). 
 With that as his checklist, no wonder Beckett was in therapy for depression at the time. Sitting 
down at the desk with pen in hand, what came to Beckett was a savage parody of an impossible 
method, producing a novel that uses the third-person omniscient narrative to reveal existence as a 
boring irrelevancy and therefore undermine the worth of revelation as a whole. Throughout Murphy, 
there is a tone of someone insulting that which has rejected him. This is most obvious in the hyper-
obscure vocabulary and unnecessary allusions such as to “the extreme theophanism of William of 
Champeaux,” (Beckett, Murphy 49) ridiculing the pedantic referentiality of Joyce and Eliot, but even 
Murphy's first line, “The sun shone, having no alternative, on the nothing new,” (1) exemplifies this 
tendency, as it is an aggressively terrible opening to a novel. From the widest view possible, this 
opening tells us that nothing exists in the universe of Murphy that is of genuine interest, and the 
uselessness of the third-person perspective not only makes it impossible to identify with the world or its 
characters, it also calls into question the value of the modernist epiphanic and the grand Idea that is 
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being sought after. When Murphy dies toward the end and his ashes are dismissively stomped into the 
floor of a pub, it merely confirms what was clear from the start: that none of this matters in the 
slightest. It is not that the modernist method of revelation fails to reveal, it is that what it reveals is 
nothing but pedantic trifles or a self-defeating talent for the inopportune, telling us at the start of 
Chapter 3 that the moon is “29,000 miles nearer the earth than it had been for four years,” (Beckett, 
Murphy 17) when that information clarifies nothing, despite Murphy's love for astrology, or elsewhere 
declaring that “the above passage is carefully calculated to deprave the cultivated reader” (Beckett, 
Murphy 71) when such a narrative intrusion interrupts that depravity and thereby stymies its own 
purpose by puncturing any erotic momentum. The overall effect is not that we distrust the narrative 
perspective, but instead that we come to believe there is nothing worthwhile for it to view. When 
Murphy is described as a “seedy solipsist,” (Beckett, Murphy 50) the satire is not that Murphy is 
actually not a solipsist, as he undoubtedly is one, but instead the joke is on the value of value-
judgments in general, since, as we know from Proust, there is “no communication possible because 
there are no vehicles of communication possible” (539). This is a necessary distinction to make before 
moving on to an examination of the contents described, as Murphy's (and also by necessity Murphy's, 
since form is content) project is doomed from the start. Beckett is not writing the type of satire, such as 
the political, where he is advocating for the opposite of what he describes,, that for example empiricism 
is the way out of Murphy's solipsism. Murphy is not an example of what not to do, he is an example of 
how nothing one does matters. What makes Murphy worth observing is that detailing how he gets it all 
wrong is the best possible way to make it obvious that there is no getting it right, because Murphy lives 
out the failure of philosophy. 
 Since it spends an entire chapter describing Murphy's mind as separate from his body, and 
because the chapters tend to alternate between Murphy or mind-centric and Celia or world-centric 
chapters, recapitulating the mind-body divide in its form, Occasionalism provides the traditional lens 
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through which to view Murphy, and I would agree with Kenner that Murphy's most salient feature is its 
skewering of Descartes, so it is now necessary to review Descartes' method as described in the 
Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy before showing how Murphy gets that 
method all wrong, undermining not only Murphy's efforts but the method itself. Descartes, realizing 
that much of what appears to be certain knowledge is in fact mere “custom and example,” (9) decides 
to employ a method of universal doubt, tearing down the foundations of knowledge to rebuild them 
upon a rational certainty modeled after mathematics. Descartes describes his method as consisting of 
the following four steps: 
The first was never to accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be 
such; that is to say, carefully to avoid hasty judgment and prejudice; and to 
include nothing more in my judgments than what presented itself to my mind so 
clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to call it in doubt. 
 
The second, to divide each of the difficulties I would examine into as many 
parts as possible and as was required in order to better resolve them. 
 
The third, to conduct my thoughts in an orderly fashion, by commencing with 
those objects that are simplest and easiest to know, in order to ascend little by 
little, as by degrees, to the knowledge of the most composite things, and by 
supposing an order even among those things that do not naturally precede one 
another.  
 
And the last, everywhere to make enumerations so complete and reviews so 
general that I was assured of having omitted nothing. (11) 
 
And do the results of this method come up with anything for Descartes? Why, only that he must “regard 
the heavens, the air, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things as nothing but the 
bedeviling hoaxes of [his] dreams,” (Descartes 62) since all of existence could be an illusion created by 
an evil deceiver god. 
 This possibility of universal deception leads Descartes to reject entirely the evidence of the 
senses, retreating to the realm of pure mind, which is a separate substance from the body, and it is only 
in that mind that Descartes finds any initial certainty, arguing that even if his thoughts are deceived, he 
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indubitably still has those thoughts, and therefore he exists, if not physically, then at least as a “thinking 
thing” (65). While the body is a composite that can always be further divided, the mind is a single, 
unified substance, albeit one that lacks the power to have created either the world or itself. Since there 
must be a primary cause, Descartes declares that God must exist, and “as what is more perfect ... cannot 
come into being from what is less perfect,” (73) God is therefore perfect and does not deceive us in our 
perceptions of the world. While there is a correspondence between the body and mind, there is not 
direct causation, since God is responsible for all action in each occasion, hence the name 
“Occasionalism” was later given to this school of thought. 
 The reason why it is necessary to understand the illegitimacy of the third-person omniscient 
narrator in Murphy before discussing the Cartesian influence proposed by Kenner and others is that 
Descartes' entire system, despite his appeals to logic, rests only on God, and in Murphy God is either 
absent, grown bored with the “nothing new,” or has turned into an idiot, replaced by the tale of Suk's 
horoscope which signifies nothing. Kenner rightly describes the basic framework as revolving around 
the problem that Murphy's “body loves Celia… while his mind abhors the complications she 
introduces” (Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study 51). Using the mind/body division as his point of 
departure, Murphy wants nothing more than to escape into the realm of pure mind, to be “not free but a 
mote in the dark of absolute freedom,” (Beckett, Murphy 66) but he cannot overcome his body's 
“deplorable susceptibility to Celia” (Beckett, Murphy 103). Kenner doesn't point this out, since he 
focuses only on thematic content, but this division between body and mind also determines the 
structure of the novel's 13 chapters, which alternate between Murphy/mind chapters and Celia/body (or 
Neary et. al/world, which amounts to the same thing) and with Chapter 6 as what David Tucker in 
Samuel Beckett and Arnold Geulincx: A Literary Fantasia describes as “the novel's abstract dead 
center” (49). In this chapter, Beckett demonstrates most clearly his method of parodying Descartes and 
other Occasionalists, so it requires special attention.  
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 For Descartes, only the mind can be fully known to itself, the world is uncertain, and the 
metaphor for knowledge or truth is a visual one, “the clear and distinct,” meaning that truth is light or 
the fully seen. Murphy thinks of his mind in Cartesian terms, “a large hollow sphere, hermetically 
closed to the universe without,” (Beckett, Murphy 65) but unlike Descartes' notion of the mind as an 
indivisible substance, Murphy's mind consists of three zones, “light, half light, dark, each with its 
specialty,” (Beckett, Murphy 67) with the “light” closest to the world or “forms with parallel,” the “half 
light” pure interior contemplation or “forms without parallel,” and the “dark” pure mind, a “flux of 
forms” or “matrix of surds”4 (Beckett, Murphy 68). Even if Descartes was going to divide the mind into 
three zones, the correlation should be the exact opposite, with the pure mind as the region of light, fully 
known to itself as a thinking-thing, and the region closest to the obfuscation of the world as the dark. It 
is not just that Murphy misconstrues Descartes, it's that he uses Descartes' method to arrive at a 
position that is diametrically opposed to Descartes' own. It's a deliberate inversion5 rather than an 
accidental flaw. This is why it's necessary to reference Descartes when explicating Murphy, since one 
can't get the joke unless one knows the subject of that joke, but also why Beckett can't be confused for 
a Cartesian, since in a parody much of the joke lies not in the violence of negative results, but in the 
precise aptness of those negative results as an inversion of that which the parody inhabits and thereby 
destroys. That aptness can only be achieved by someone who knows their target well, but to study it in 
such fashion they must possess an assassin's detachment. 
 Chapter 6 also explains why Murphy is happy to adopt Suk's horoscope as his guiding celestial 
principle, despite its lack of obvious help. Since Murphy only cares about dissolving in the realm of 
pure mind (not his individual mind, but the universal mind), he is content to merely “accept this partial 
congruence of the world of his mind with the world of his body as due to some ... process of 
                                                 
4 Surds are irrational numbers, another deliberate inversion of Descartes, since for Descartes math is the height of the 
rational. 
5 On the part of the author, not on the part of Murphy 
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supernatural determination,” but Murphy's narcissism means the nature of that supernatural force is 
irrelevant, as long as it doesn't impede his escape to “the closed system” (Beckett, Murphy 66) of his 
mind, where he has absolute freedom of choice. This again is an exact inversion of Descartes, whose 
whole purpose was to use God as a means by which to verify the outside world. With God as absent or 
irrelevant, no longer able to certify the link between mind and world, Murphy's retreat results in self-
love, the turning away from the world rather than the Cartesian search for a way back to it, hence the 
quote at the start of the chapter, “Amor intellectualis quo Murphy se ipsum amat” (“The intellectual 
love with which Murphy loves himself”), (65) which takes Spinoza's “Deus se ipsum amore 
intellectuali infinito amat” (“God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love”) and replaces God 
with Murphy to highlight Murphy's presumption.6 
 Murphy's arrogant self-absorption only increases as the novel continues, particularly when he 
begins working at the insane asylum and believes the patients to be more-perfect versions of himself, 
and it is at this point in the novel where the ethics of Arnold Geulincx become most relevant. Beckett 
began writing Murphy in 1935, and the writing had ground to a halt by early 1936 with Chapters 1-8 
completed. After Beckett went to the Trinity Library in Dublin where he read Geulincx's Ethics, he 
wrote in a letter that he now sees the novel as a “break down” between Geulincx's “where you are 
worth nothing ...” and the Malraux quote which begins Chapter 9, “It is difficult for one who lives 
isolated from the everyday world to not seek others like himself” (as quoted, Tucker xiii).The Malraux 
quote can be applied to the fact that it is at this point in the novel where Murphy goes to work in an 
insane asylum, and is delighted by the “self-immersed indifference to the contingencies of the 
contingent world” (Beckett Murphy 102) of the mental patients, believing that he has finally found 
others like himself. The Geulincx quote is opposed to Murphy's urge to find like-minded souls not 
because Geulincx advocates solitude, but because Geulincx's notion of the ethical highlights that 
                                                 
6 This is pointed out by David Tucker in Samuel Beckett and Arnold Geulincx, 54. 
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Murphy misinterprets the Malraux-style urge for others by reducing them to himself, as Murphy also 
does to the stars and Suk's horoscope, his increased confidence in his methods causing him to now 
believe that “they were his stars, [and] he was the prior system” (Beckett, Murphy 110). 
 And why does Geulincx place such emphasis on ethics? Because not to do so is narcissistic, 
makes possible the placing of oneself at the center of existence rather than God, just as the chapter on 
Murphy's mind is placed near the center of the novel. In the Geulincxian universe, ethical responsibility 
is all one has, since God is responsible for everything else. Geulincx takes Descartes' notion of the 
mind/body split and makes it even more extreme, asserting “the radical incapacity and impotence of the 
human mind” (Tucker 13) to affect the world outside itself. While for Descartes the body and mind 
were linked in the pineal gland, Geulincx severs that link, likening the correspondence between mind 
and body as that between two clocks which tell the same time but do nothing to influence each other's 
motions. Where Descartes' method was dedicated to the search for truth, Geulincx sets that search aside 
as impossible, making ignorance the foundation of his philosophy. Since for Geulincx “in order to 
qualify as performing an action, [one] must have knowledge of this action,” (as quoted, Tucker 14) and 
since one always lacks such knowledge, the only remaining ethical choice is to abstain from all 
judgment. When Murphy, who thinks of himself as “of the little world” tries to stay in that little world 
as the insane are able to, he believes that he is unable to stay there because he is always dragged back 
out into “the big world” (Beckett, Murphy 106) by Celia and the rest. However, what actually prevents 
Murphy from becoming pure mind as he desires, as shown by Geulincx's emphasis on inaction, is 
precisely that Murphy desires it. The insane, in contrast, are abstention incarnate, as they simply not 
want without wanting to not want. By wanting to not want anything, Murphy commits the cardinal sin 
according to Geulincx, and Murphy's efforts can only result in narcissism, as shown by both the novel's 
climax, a chess game with Mr. Endon, and the novel's anti-climax, Murphy's senseless death. 
 Beckett set great importance on the chess game between Murphy and Mr. Endon (Greek for 
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“within”), refusing to excise it when asked by publishers, and even considering a cover that featured 
two monkeys playing chess. As David Tucker describes it, this chess game is where Murphy's self-
defeating narcissism becomes most obvious. Since this argument requires an intricate knowledge of 
chess, I am reliant upon Tucker here, but find his points convincing. According to Tucker, Mr. Endon, 
nearly catatonic in his pure interiority, is the paragon of what Murphy hopes to be, as Endon has “a 
psychosis so limpid and imperturbable that Murphy felt drawn to it as Narcissus to his fountain” 
(Beckett, Murphy 112). The asymmetry between them is immediately obvious, as while Murphy desires 
Endon's lack of desire, Endon obviously does not respond in kind, because “Murphy is just chess for 
Endon” (Beckett, Murphy 145) instead of a person. Although they both sit at the same chess board, it 
quickly becomes clear that Murphy and Endon are playing two different games. Since Murphy views 
Endon as his idol, all Murphy wants is for his idol to recognize him, and this desire to be acknowledged 
both determines Murphy's chess strategy and expels him from the realm of Endon. As Tucker argues, 
this inability to rid himself of desire is why Murphy is always White7, as White goes first, is the 
aggressor rather than defender, and why this initial move is “the primary cause of all White's 
subsequent difficulties” (Beckett, Murphy 146) since it reveals “the original sin of Murphy's necessary 
assertion of self” (Tucker 63). Endon doesn't respond to any move Murphy makes, instead preferring to 
move his pieces in a manner which has nothing to do with chess, using them to repetitively create the 
same “monochrome visual pattern” (Tucker 64). Murphy's moves become increasingly chaotic as he 
struggles to elicit a response, any form of recognition from Endon, and to thereby interrupt the “closed 
system” (Tucker 64) of both Endon's chess game and mind. When Murphy sees that the next move in 
the repeating pattern of Endon's “irresistible game” (Beckett, Murphy 145) will cause Endon to 
illegally move himself into checkmate, and that clearly Endon is never going to take notice of him, 
Murphy instead surrenders, “as further solicitation would be frivolous and vexatious” (Beckett, Murphy 
                                                 
7 Endon refuses to play when given the active role of White 
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147) and to win this game for Murphy is to lose. Tucker concludes that the narcissism of Murphy's 
desire to be like Endon means that he can never become Endon, and will forever remain “a speck in 
Mr. Endon's unseen” (Beckett, Murphy 150). 
 Finally, I would argue that the results of Murphy's failure to achieve a Geulincxian withdrawal 
from all desire are made clear not only by his senseless death, but also by the manner in which his 
death occurs, since Murphy brings it on himself. Although Murphy immediately feels at home in his 
job at the asylum, he threatens to quit unless his room in the attic is furnished with heat. Murphy's 
demand is met by running a gas pipe into his room in rather unsafe fashion, and it is this gas that kills 
him. In a significant moment of foreshadowing, Murphy decides that “the etymology of gas” is 
“chaos,” (Beckett, Murphy 106) and therefore it is chaos that kills Murphy. Kenner aptly describes how 
in a different novel with moral values, a typical world where things mattered, this would be an angry 
moment, a moment that protested Murphy's mistreatment by fate or God, but clearly that is not the 
world of Murphy (Samuel Beckett: A Critical Reader 52). This chaos might still symbolize Murphy's 
defeat if Murphy had embraced the rational aspect of Cartesianism. However, since Murphy believes 
the darkness of absolute mind to be surds instead of rational numbers, an anarchic flux of forms rather 
than the stability of logical clarity as in Descartes, the chaos that kills Murphy is exactly what Murphy 
desired, “his body quiet” and his mind “free,” (Beckett, Murphy 151) with the final joke being that the 
selfless freedom Murphy craves is actually the destruction of the self. The reader laughs rather than 
cries at Murphy's death, because in a senseless world without God or inherent value, such a senseless 
death is not a tragedy, but an escape. 
B. Watt 
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I wrote 
a book called The World As I Found It, I should have to include a report on 
my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, 
and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or 
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rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone 
could not be mentioned in that book. – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, 5.631 
 
 One of the great ironies of Descartes' thought is that while he claims that his method of 
doubting will rid his ideas of all presuppositions in the service of logic, he then makes several 
extravagantly metaphysical claims about God, without whose presence Descartes' system collapses. As 
Murphy has just shown, the absence of God leaves a pointless world from which one narcissistically 
flees into the dark of one's own mind. In response to this problem, much of Western philosophy post-
Descartes came to rely less and less upon God as a foundational element and focused instead on the 
rationality that was Descartes' original goal. In my conception of the history of philosophy, this effort to 
mold the world into a logical framework culminated in the early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
 Wittgenstein's extreme logicism, the end result of employing the Cartesian method, caused him 
to reject any possibility of describing the subject. Following Murphy's destruction of Descartes, Beckett 
used Watt to arrive at a similar conclusion. Whereas the parody of Descartes in Murphy was intentional, 
Beckett never read Wittgenstein, so the parody here is more a result of Beckett using the basics of 
Descartes, then intuiting the necessary results once God has been subtracted and only logic is left. If 
logic becomes dominant, then the subject will be gradually eliminated, because the subject can never 
be purely logical.  The endless lists found in Watt use Descartes' method, but they push that method 
further than Descartes did to highlight of how little use logic is in describing the subject, mocking 
logic's limits. Wittgenstein pushes the logicality of Descartes to a similar extreme, but, in the Tractatus 
at least, he accepts those limits rather than challenging them through satire as Beckett does. Still, 
because the characters in Watt are almost entirely lacking in interiority, it is through Wittgenstein rather 
than Descartes that Watt should be read, because Watt is almost the book described by Wittgenstein in 
the above quote, in which the subject is unavailable to itself. 
 Watt's opacity means that it has attracted the widest array of critical approaches, often with 
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contradictory findings, and this confusion results from Watt's inchoate form. For example, Watt begins 
in the same third-person omniscient mode as Murphy, but then occasional mentions begin to creep in of 
an “I” voice, until we learn that Watt's story has actually been told to a second figure named Sam, both 
in a mental institution of some sort, and that Sam is telling the story from his limited perspective rather 
than some omniscient figure as we thought. This does not seem like some intentional move that Beckett 
was planning all along, as the text does little to hint at Sam's presence in the opening, but instead seems 
more like a spontaneous change that Beckett made mid-composition. Regardless, this means that even 
very basic questions cannot be answered, such as “Is Watt in the first or third-person?” This is a 
particularly important question because Feldman locates Watt as where Beckett begins to write 
phenomenologically, but to write phenomenologically requires the first-person perspective, because 
phenomenology, as Husserl says in Ideas 1, is always starting “from the I” (57).  For that reason, I 
would argue that while Watt does indeed show flashes of phenomenology's influence, such moments 
are still embryonic, rare enough that they are by no means the most distinctive feature of the novel. 
Other critics have tried to make of Watt a Freudian allegory, such as Daniel Katz in Saying I No More, 
but I feel that the lack of interiority means that such readings are grasping for straws, seeking to know 
when the novel asks for the opposite, as Watt consists mostly not of significant details, but insignificant 
details tortured through all the possibilities allowed within a logical syntax.  
 Kenner's reading of Watt in 1987's The Mechanic Muse would agree that the subject of Watt is 
“man the syntactic animal ... the man who must order names into structure,” (103) with Kenner 
presciently describing Watt's obsession with reducing the world to a list of possibilities as “proto-
computer language” (96). However, I have to depart from Kenner here for two reasons: first, that 
Kenner had already declared in Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study that he considers Watt to be “the most 
engaging of Beckett's creations,” (47) a suggestion that I find baffling and that makes me mistrust his 
judgment in reference to Watt, and also that Kenner's general reading in both Samuel Beckett: A 
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Critical Study and The Mechanic Muse is that Watt is an allegory for the impact of God's absence on 
Cartesian logic, in which “Beckett comes closer to the Cartesian spirit than Descartes himself, for 
Descartes, when he took his attention away from the immutable truths of mathematics, could resolve 
manifold confusions with God” (Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study 120). And why exactly do I find 
Descartes inadequate for approaching Watt? After all, it could be considered a perfect example of steps 
three and four of Descartes' method, considering things in an “orderly fashion” and then, ad nauseum, 
the need to “make enumerations so complete  and reviews so general” that one is sure of “having 
omitted nothing,” as in Watt's description of Mr. Knott's movements, mercifully excerpted: 
Here he stood. Here he sat. Here he knelt. Here he lay. Here he moved, to 
and fro, from the door to the window, from the window to the door; from 
the window to the door, from the door to the window; from the fire to the 
bed, from the bed to the fire; from the bed to the fire, from the fire to the 
bed; from the door to the fire, from the fire to the door; from the fire to the 
door, from the door to the fire; from the window to the bed, from the bed to 
the window; from the bed to the window, from the window to the bed; 
from the fire to the window, from the window to the fire … (Beckett, Watt 
167) 
 
While this limits the logical possibilities and then enumerates their possible combinations so as to feign 
a complete understanding, what is actually omitted is any real knowledge of Knott or Watt themselves, 
their interior subjectivities. Whereas Descartes makes the cogito the foundation of his system, 
emphasizing it as the only certainty, the “I” of “I think” is entirely absent in Watt, and for that reason it 
is better read through Wittgenstein. 
 To understand why that is, only the briefest of glosses is necessary for Wittgenstein's Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein wants to propose a logical framework for logic in which “nothing 
is accidental” (9) by reducing language to its simplest parts, names or primitive signs that “cannot be 
dissected any further” (25) with these simple parts then given meaning via their syntactical groupings 
in composite statements that “restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no” (41). Determining the truth 
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then only requires the simple matter of verifying the correspondence between the statement and the 
fact, discovering the yes or no. Logical syntax itself can never be stated, however, it can only be 
demonstrated, because any statement attempting to define that syntax would itself be reliant upon that 
syntax, so that “what expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language,” and propositions 
“display” or “show the logical form of reality,” (Wittgenstein 51) but cannot comment upon it from an 
exterior position. As a result, any ultimate “sense of the world lies outside the world,” (Wittgenstein 
145) and one can only speak of that which one can logically express, so that “the limits of my language 
mean the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein 115). Wittgenstein does not say that nothing exists that 
cannot be put into language8, but only that what cannot be spoken of cannot be logically known, and 
vice versa, so that “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (Wittgenstein 151). The 
goal of philosophy is not to provide answers to metaphysical questions, but simply to identify which 
questions are metaphysical and therefore nonsensical and should be passed over in silence, to dissolve 
the question rather than resolve the problem, so that “the solution to the problem of life is seen as the 
vanishing of the problem” (Wittgenstein 149). One of the great peculiarities of Wittgenstein's system is 
that the main problem he dissolves is subjectivity itself, declaring that “there is no such thing as the 
soul, the subject, etc.,” (109) because the “I” is a logical tautology9, a purely deictic statement that only 
acts as placeholder to indicate the speaker. Most perversely, not only does the “I” lack sense, but 
Wittgenstein's entire system does as well, when judged by its own terms, since it provides a synoptic 
view of language while claiming that no such view is possible, making it like a “ladder” that one must 
“throw away ... after [one] has climbed it” (151). 
 I believe that Wittgenstein provides the best lens through which to view Watt precisely because 
Watt demonstrates, as does the Tractatus, that “the facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not 
                                                 
8 This is Wittgenstein's definition of the mythical 
9 This is a complex argument, but suffice it to say that a statement can only have a positive meaning if it is possible for it 
to also have a negative meaning, and since the “I” is always assumed for the speaking of any statement, it cannot have a 
negative meaning, and therefore also cannot have a positive meaning.  
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to its solution” (Wittgenstein 149). As seen in the list of Mr. Knott's movements above, every word is 
as simple as possible, all one syllable except for “moved” and “window,” but these Wittgenstein-style 
“simples” can't ever add up to anything outside of their primitive, objective meaning, so that we learn 
nothing of Mr. Knott himself, because, as Watt says, “obscure keys may open simple locks, but simple 
keys obscure locks never” (Beckett, Watt 101). This means that the lists themselves are useless, always 
vulnerable to the intrusion of an unforeseen fact, since there is no possible view of the whole. A notable 
instance of this is in Part 2, where what should be the simple problem of feeding the remnants of Mr. 
Knott's meals to a dog, eliminating the last trace, instead spirals out into a 25-page description of all 
that is required to ensure that the dog fulfills its duties, including a caretaker family and their long 
genealogy. Despite all that effort, the uselessness of the system to contain the whole, to eliminate that 
final trace, is all that is demonstrated, as the systematizing efforts ends, as it does at the end of each list, 
with the recognition that  
Not that for a moment Watt supposed that he had penetrated the forces at play, 
in this particular instance, or even perceived the forms that they upheaved ... 
but he had turned, little by little, a disturbance into words, he had made a pillow 
of old words, for a head. (Beckett, Watt 94) 
 
The form of the book itself demonstrates this inability to organize all into a tidy whole, since it 
ends with an addenda containing all the scraps that could not be fit elsewhere into the novel. 
 While Wittgenstein himself admits that logic cannot express the illogical or mystical, and Watt 
would thus just be a demonstration of the Tractatus, Watt also inverts the Tractatus, just as Murphy 
inverted Descartes, because in Watt's world, the simplest objects, the names which are the foundation 
from which Wittgenstein's logical system builds, are the most impossible to name once Watt enters Mr. 
Knott's house. This desire to name is Watt's only defining quality, the need for words “to be applied to 
his situation ... and in a general way to the conditions of being in which he found himself,” (Beckett, 
Watt 64) but this fails once Watt enters the realm of Knott, as demonstrated when even the pots in 
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Knott's kitchen fail to correspond fully to the name pot, a situation described thusly: 
Looking at a pot, for example, or thinking of a pot ... it was in vain that Watt 
said, pot, pot. Well, perhaps not quite in vain, but very nearly. For it was not a 
pot, the more he looked, the more he reflected ... it resembled a pot, it was 
almost a pot, but it was not a pot of which one could say, Pot, pot, and be 
comforted. It was in vain that it answered, with unexceptionable adequacy, all 
the purposes, and performed all the offices of a pot, it was not a pot. And it was 
just this hairbreadth departure from the nature of a true pot that so excruciated 
Watt. (Beckett, Watt 64) 
 
If simples fail, as they do here, then the entire system is for naught, and the true nature of anything is 
unknowable. The comedy then is that Watt worships Knott when Knott is precisely what ruins Watt's 
ability to systematize. Why does Knott ruin it? Because in my reading, rather than representing any one 
problem expressed by language, Knott represents the main threat to Wittgenstein's system, the problem 
of expression itself, which is polysemy. If a word can never be reduced to a single meaning, then the 
system is no longer self-evident, and the possibilities of the name “Knott” themselves cannot be 
reduced to any one meaning, due to the numerous plays on language available. “Knott” could mean 
“knot,” indicating a puzzle or knot that can be solved or untied, that there is an actual answer, even if 
that answer is unknown. “Knott” could also mean “naught” nothingness as it exists on its own, a 
positive quality, however paradoxical, or it could mean “not” indicating the negation of something else, 
the antithesis of a positive quality. It is not that these particular interpretations are wrong, while others 
might prove correct, but instead that Mr. Knott represents the impossibility of all interpretative efforts, 
which explains why throughout this section I have not pushed too far with any one specific 
interpretation (Katz's Freudian reading, for example). Even if I was to choose what I believe to be the 
most likely of the three options listed above, that still gets us nowhere according to Wittgenstein, as I 
will now demonstrate.  
 Between the choice of “knott” meaning “knot” or “not/naught,” a choice between there being an 
answer and there not being an answer, I think it's clear by now that there is no answer. Choosing then 
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between “knott” as “naught” or “not,” nothingness as a positive quality that exists on its own, an 
absolute, or nothingness merely as negation applied to something else, a relative quality, then I would 
choose the latter option, because the only thing we are ever told about Knott that constitutes actual 
knowledge is that “except one, not to need, and two, a witness to his not needing, Knott needed 
nothing, as far as Watt could see ... so he needed to be witnessed. Not that he might know, no, but that 
he might not cease” (Beckett, Watt 166). Since Knott needs to be observed, one could argue that he is 
“not” rather than “naught,” because he requires something else to negate, and Knott is then the negating 
action rather than negation itself, relative rather than absolute. The reason why this helps nothing is that 
to define Knott as the action of negation is to basically make of Knott a syntactical property, a ~ in 
mathematical terms, and as Wittgenstein has just told us, language cannot express syntactical 
properties, it can only demonstrate them. Therefore, even if Knott is given the particular meaning of 
“negating action,” the result is the same as if you merely read Knott as indicating the problem of 
polysemy, because in either instance nothing meaningful can be said about him. I believe that by this 
point Beckett must have felt that way about the project of the Western novel as representation in 
general, because Watt carries all attempts at logical representation to their limits, only to show that 
everything that matters is beyond them, that what is left silent is the subject itself. Having mocked the 
rational tradition to its terminal point, Beckett would soon turn away from Cartesian 
representationalism entirely and move the focus of his attack onto what would prove to be his main 
target: Husserlian phenomenology. 
IV. Destroying the Village in Order to Save It: Beckett's Three 
Novels as a Satire of Phenomenology 
 
But it's entirely a matter of voices, no other metaphor is appropriate. – Samuel 
Beckett, The Unnamable  
 
 When I last described Beckett's engagement with philosophy, it was 1938 and he had just read 
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Mauthner's linguistic critique of representationalism, which focuses on the inability of words to link the 
images represented in the mind with the thing-in-itself. What Beckett read next, Sartre's Master’s thesis 
The Imagination, made this problem irrelevant, as it contained Sartre's description of Husserlian 
phenomenology and its new conception of consciousness as intentionality. The Imagination presents 
Sartre's summaries of other philosophers rather than Sartre's own ideas, so it is Husserl rather than 
Sartre whom Beckett would have learned about by reading Sartre's work. In the classic Cartesian 
model, mind and body are separate, and the problem then is how to make the immanent correspond 
with the transcendent. Instead of answering the problem of the subject/object divide, Husserl dissolves 
it, or, as Dan Zahavi describes it in Husserl's Phenomenology, “rather than saying that we experience 
representations, one could say that our experiences are presentational” (19). To sum up an intricate 
argument, Husserl points out that “re-presentation presupposes perception,” or an initial presentation, 
and since the represented object is only possible based upon the object presented in perception, 
perception is therefore primary, “directed at real objects in the world ... unmediated by any mental 
representations” (as quoted, Zahavi 19). After doing away with a correspondence theory, Husserl also 
dissolves the problem of how the subject reaches the object by defining the subject as always intended 
toward something else, always already a mixture of immanence and transcendence rather than pure 
immanence as in the Cartesian model. For Husserl, “it is not a problem for the subject to reach the 
object, since the subject is per se self-transcending” (Zahavi 21). By intentionality, Husserl means that 
rather than passively receive the inherent meaning of an object, the subject intends it, actively 
participates in the constitution of the object's sense, and the object “is only an object for us because of 
our own meaning-giving contribution” (Zahavi 42). 
 I will detail shortly just how much of phenomenology Beckett would have gotten from Sartre, 
but it is immediately obvious that if Beckett's method in Murphy and Watt had been to parodically 
inhabit the two main routes in Western philosophy used to bridge the gap between subject and object, 
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God or logic, only to show the failure of these efforts and the irremediable existence of that severance, 
then Husserl presents a totally different kind of target for parody, since there is no gap between subject 
and object to overcome. For phenomenology, the danger is not that one will retreat into the realm of 
pure mind, as in Murphy, since there is no such realm, or that the subject will be lost through logic, as 
in Watt, since the subject is inextricable from experience. Instead, the great danger for Husserl is a 
problem already close to Beckett's heart, one mentioned almost as frequently as Democritus and 
Geulincx, that of the subjective idealism resulting in solipsism epitomized by George Berkeley's esse 
est percipi. If the object-as-perceived only can be perceived via the bestowal upon it of meaning by the 
subject, then it's possible to argue that all meaning is subjective, relative and arbitrary, a mere chimera 
of language. This is the precise problem addressed in the Three Novels. 
 Instead of the visual, phenomenology requires a different notion of the medium of 
consciousness, and therefore a different method of representing that consciousness.10 Murphy and Watt 
are both delivered from the third-person perspective, so that the action is seen rather than heard, 
presented visually rather than linguistically. This reliance upon the visual stems from the fact that for 
Descartes and the rational tradition, consciousness is sight, “the mental gaze,” (Descartes 91) and 
knowledge is that which is seen with clarity, “the most clear and distinct,” (Descartes 77) while one 
“consider[s] ... things within [one's] self silently and without words” (Descartes 68). This idea of 
consciousness as images continued through Wittgenstein's Tractatus, in which “we picture facts to 
ourselves,” such pictures are “a model” which is “laid against reality like a measure,” (15) and logic is 
“not a body of doctrine but a mirror-image of the world” (133). While modernism is well past the 
                                                 
10 This distinction is made most clearly in Emmanuel Levinas' Totality and Infinity, but to include an exegesis of Levinas' 
argument would be to distract from the purpose here. In brief, Levinas equates Western rationalism, specifically 
Heideggerian ontology, to metaphors of knowledge as sight, indicating comprehension, and reducing the object to the 
seen/known, but phenomenology moves to the recognition of how Otherness overflows comprehension, evidenced by 
how the Other speaks for their own self, and how that language can never be pinned down to a single reductive meaning, 
since language is always polyvalent, and therefore ethics is primary over ontology, since the infinity of the Other as 
language overflows the totality of its reductive comprehension in the vision of the Same. 
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convention of objective description, as this can only provide a correspondence and not the thing-in-
itself, it still predominately uses the third-person perspective. While the modernist focus on subjectivity 
might indicate the lack of any objective perspective, it still keeps the model of knowledge as sight, as 
for Proust “style is more a question of vision than of technique,” (Beckett, Proust 551) and it actually 
provides the culmination of those efforts, as epiphany itself is a moment of total sight, from the Greek 
epiphainein, “to manifest, display, show off, come suddenly into view.” 
 Beckett was mocking the modernist epiphanic rather than genuinely attempting to reveal it, but 
this tradition still set the terms of the early position Beckett was inhabiting only to mock, and that is 
why both Murphy and for the most part Watt are written from the third-person perspective, with 
Murphy's third-person omniscient narrator reflecting its more Cartesian target of ridiculing the efficacy 
of God-like all-seeing power in a world where there is nothing worth seeing, and the third-person 
limited narration of Watt as indicating how the modern had replaced God with logic, but in doing so 
had lost the ability to fully know from an exterior position due to logic's inability to foresee all 
possibilities, always requiring an appenda to accommodate the inevitable appearance of unforeseen 
possibilities. The metaphor of knowledge as sight is applied to Murphy himself, with Murphy lauded 
for his “ability to look on, no matter what the spectacle” (Beckett, Murphy 54) which symbolizes 
Murphy's ability to recognize harsh truths that others would look away from. In a letter from the time, 
Beckett also applies this metaphor to Geulincx, applauding Geulincx's “conviction that the sub specie 
aeternitatis vision is the only excuse for remaining alive” and that Geulincx “does not put out his eyes 
on that account” (The Letters of Samuel Beckett: 1929-1940 319). Here Beckett commends in Geulincx 
a total comprehension that does not retreat from its own terrible vision, and which could be seen as the 
fulfillment of the modernist method, despite its negativity. 
 Post-WWII, Beckett spurns that method, and with it any effort at a “sub specie aeternitatis” 
vision, moving from the third-person perspective to the first-person, from English to French, and away 
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from the modernist epiphanic and its method of revelation toward a method that instead highlighted the 
inevitable slippages of language that ruin any attempt to capture the particularities of experience. In 
1946, back home in Dublin, Beckett has his famous breakthrough standing on a pier, one which 
determined his subsequent career, realizing that “Joyce had gone as far as one could in the direction of 
knowing more ... always adding to” and that Beckett's own method would run in the opposite direction, 
focusing on “impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in taking away, in subtracting rather than 
adding” (as quoted, Knowlson, Damned to Fame 319). Instead of continuing to attempt the impossible, 
Beckett would deny the possibility of any total comprehension of vision, of knowledge as the 
revelation of full sight, and instead begin to simply acknowledge the mess of what was in front of him. 
It was on that day, as Beckett said later, that “Molloy and the others came to [him] ... when [he] became 
aware of [his] own folly” (as quoted, Knowlson, Damned to Fame 319). Shortly afterward, in 1949, 
Beckett gave his most often-quoted definition of his own method in Three Dialogues with Georges 
Duthuit, using the paintings of Bram Van Velde to describe the role of the artist as not to express, but to 
highlight the impossibility of expression, trapped in the situation “of him who is helpless, cannot act, in 
the event cannot paint, since he is obliged to paint,” but who “in the event paints,” even though “there 
is nothing to paint and nothing to paint with” (560). Duthuit immediately points out that at least such 
art is “expressive of the impossibility to express,” (Beckett, Three Dialogues 561) but as I've already 
shown in the section on Democritus, Beckett rejects such logic, in which “everything is doomed to 
become occasion,” in the belief that “what should concern us is the acute and increasing anxiety of the 
relation” (Beckett, Three Dialogues 562) between artist and occasion, subject and object, and all an 
artist can do is “fail as no other dare fail” (Beckett, Three Dialogues 563). 
 Although these quotes from Three Dialogues are better known, I believe that Beckett actually 
gives the clearest explanation of the problem he is addressing in a 1949 letter to Duthuit that also 
describes Bram Van Velde's work. In this letter, Beckett hails Van Velde's painting because it is “the 
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first to repudiate relation ... not the relation with this or that ... but the state of being in relation as such, 
the state of being in front of” (The Letters of Samuel Beckett: 1941 – 1956 140). Whereas Murphy had 
attempted to escape into the “inside” of pure mind, Van Velde's art carries the extremism of denial even 
further, as it makes clear that “the break with the outside world entails the break with the inside world” 
because “what are called outside and inside are one and the same” (The Letters of Samuel Beckett: 
1941 – 1956 140). Beckett recognizes again that such painting fails, that it does make an attempt to 
reconnect the inside and outside, but it is different because it makes this effort only to highlight “the 
impossibility of reconnecting” (The Letters of Samuel Beckett: 1941 – 1956 140). According to 
Beckett, this effort of the failure to connect is to be embraced, not the results of the effort, because it is 
“the gran rifuto that interests [him] ... what lies beyond the outside-inside where [Van Velde] does his 
striving, not the scale of the striving itself” (The Letters of Samuel Beckett: 1941 – 1956 140).  
 Throughout both this letter and the Three Dialogues, it is clear that, after his revelation in 1946, 
Beckett had a more radical notion of what was required of the artist, the terms that must be inhabited. 
As always, Beckett recognizes but refuses the logical necessity of saying that Van Velde “paints the 
impossibility of painting” and therefore is still in relation to it. Beckett instead claims that Van Velde 
avoids this trap because rather than being “in front of,” Van Velde is “inside,” that he “is them, and they 
are him,” meaning that Van Velde is not just refusal, but “refusal and refusal to accept refusal,” (The 
Letters of Samuel Beckett: 1941 – 1956 140) the action of refusing rather than the refusal itself, the 
motion of pushing away rather than what is being pushed.  This denial of meaning is consistent with 
Beckett's earlier views, since he is always satirizing rather than endorsing, but there is something else 
new here. Why does Beckett, whose whole career up to this point consisted in mocking Western 
concepts of the mind/body split, now believe that there is no difference between the inside and outside? 
And why the new emphasis on relationality, the problem of “being in relation” which makes it 
impossible to reach “what lies beyond the outside-inside”? I believe that the answer lies in Beckett's 
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aforementioned reading of Sartre's thesis The Imagination in 1938, because in phenomenology 
subjectivity is the exact mixture of the outside-inside described above.  
 We know that Beckett knew of Husserl's notion of consciousness as an inside-outside, 
consisting of an immanent noesis or mental action and a transcendent noema or recipient of that mental 
action, because, as Matthew Feldman has shown, the last two words in Beckett's philosophy journal, 
taken from Sartre, were the words “noèse” and “noème” (Falsifying Beckett 175).11 Before moving on 
to making my specific argument about how phenomenology can be used to understand the form and 
progression of the Three Novels, I'd like to demonstrate that although Beckett never read Husserl 
directly, he would have gained more than enough knowledge of phenomenology from The Imagination 
to parody it in the Three Novels, and I will do so by quoting from Sartre to provide a brief explication 
of Husserlian phenomenology itself. Importantly, Sartre does not present his own version of 
phenomenology, as in the later Being and Nothingness, but instead summarizes Husserl's thought as a 
way of working past the subject-object divide. Since Beckett frequently relied upon such summaries, as 
in Windelband, I believe that Beckett's lack of direct contact with Husserl's writing does little to 
damage my argument here. 
  As Beckett knew from The Imagination, phenomenology is “a description of the structures of 
transcendental consciousness founded on the intuition of the essence of these structures” (Sartre 125). 
Using the “essential approach” of “the epochē ... [or] parenthesizing of the natural attitude,” (Sartre 
126) the phenomenologist withholds “the general positing of existence” (Sartre 125) that characterizes 
that natural attitude. Once all questions of actual existence have been bracketed, the structures of 
consciousness can be perceived in their apodictic essence, beyond all presuppositions. Husserl's central 
claim is that “intentionality is the essential structure of all consciousness,” meaning that “every 
                                                 
11 These terms are in French, since Beckett read them in French, but I will use the English equivalents hereafter, “noesis” 
and “noema.” 
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consciousness is consciousness of something,” (Sartre 129) with the emphasis on the of.  Phenomena 
are produced by the subject but also are not mere subjective productions, presented to us with an ideal 
“noematic sense that belongs to each real consciousness [but] is not itself anything real” (Sartre 137). A 
consciousness never perceives the hyle of pure sound, but only sounds with a particular meaning 
already attached, such as doors slamming, car alarms, rain-drops hitting the window. Each mental act, 
each noesis, always has an intended object, a noema, such as thinking-action/thought, perceiving-
action/object-of-perception, etc., but “the object of consciousness ... is in principle outside of 
consciousness” (Sartre 130) and transcends that consciousness. The noetic act is reell, an actual part of 
Erlebnis or lived experience, but the noema, the intended sense I perceive in the world, is irreel, “a 
nothingness that has only an ideal existence” (Sartre 137). As both Beckett and Derrida realize, this 
means that each particular is only grasped through its ideal identity, and therefore never fully grasped 
in its this-ness or haecceity. 
 Due to Husserl's bracketing of reality, imaginary objects can serve equally well as real objects 
when it comes to descriptions of the essence of perception. Phenomenology requires the lived 
experience of a particular example, “but it matters little [whether] the individual fact that serves as a 
support for the essence is real or imaginary” (Sartre 126). Perception, where one is always in front of 
something, seeing it in profiles, consists of “a purely passive synthesis” (140) in which the 
adumbrations or individual slices of sense impressions are synthesized into a flow of experience and 
given an ideal or noematic sense through the transcendental mode of consciousness. This transcendence 
stems from the fact that pure consciousness is a precondition for experience rather than part of that 
experience, as transcendental consciousness is what experiences and can therefore never be 
experienced, like an eye that sees but cannot see itself. As I've already said, the problem for 
phenomenology, one which Husserl continuously denies, is that one might argue that since the subject 
intends the world, there is no true transcendence, only Berkeleyian solipsism. Sartre makes this point as 
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well, stating that Husserl is “fighting the errors of a certain immanentism that wants to constitute the 
world from contents of consciousness (for example the idealism of Berkeley)” (130). Overall, it should 
now be clear that Beckett had enough knowledge of phenomenology to parody it, and that he also had a 
motive, given his fascination with Berkeley. This is not to say that Beckett was a subjective idealist like 
Berkeley, but rather that Beckett found in Berkeley a particularly spectacular example of the self-
defeating problems found in philosophy, and he would be unwilling to let Husserl claim to solve it, 
although Beckett fails to offer any solution himself. 
 Finally, before turning to the general affinities between phenomenology and the Three Novels 
and then a specific examination of Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable, I'd like to more fully 
delineate the problem I am addressing. As with the Bible, the worst interpretations for the Three Novels 
are those which attempt to take everything literally.12 In this reading, the speaker in the Three Novels is 
the same throughout, beginning when a man named Moran is assigned the task of finding a mysterious 
figure named Molloy. In the process of that search, Moran begins to hallucinate that he himself is 
Molloy. He then finds himself placed in a room and begins to write of his experiences. As he progresses 
(or regresses) toward death, he forgets his past names and calls himself Malone. Upon death, he 
becomes an unnamable figure trapped in purgatory like Dante's Belacqua, awaiting the final judgment 
which will allow his interminable monologue to finally cease. The flaw with this interpretation is not 
that it explains too little, but that it explains too much. The fit is too easy. Beckett himself resisted 
efforts to overtly emphasize the unity of the Three Novels, preferring the term “3 in 1” to “trilogy,” as 
evidenced by Beckett's 1958 response to publisher John Calder's request to use the term “trilogy” on 
the cover: “Not 'trilogy,' I beseech you, just the three titles and nothing else” (The Letters of Samuel 
Beckett: 1957 – 1967 191).  Aside from Beckett's intentions, the potential unity provided by a single 
                                                 
12 Michael Robinson's The Long Sonata of the Dead is a particularly egregious example of an attempt to read all of these 
five novels as happening to the same character. 
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main character is also denied frequently within the texts themselves, as the various narrators refer to 
each “M” character as an individual separate from their self, as when the narrator of The Unnamable, 
who sees Malone as a separate figure oscillating in front of him, claims that “all these Murphys, 
Molloys and Malones do not fool me” (Beckett, Three Novels 297). 
 While I find it unrewarding to claim a single narrator throughout these novels, there is still an 
undeniable linear movement that unfolds throughout them, a disintegrative process that begins with 
Molloy and shudders to a halt in The Unnamable. Although Beckett seems uncomfortable with the 
unity indicated by the term “trilogy,” he was by no means unhappy with the three novels being printed 
together, writing to a friend in 1958 that he was “very pleased to have the 3 between the same boards at 
last” (The Letters of Samuel Beckett: 1957 – 1967 252). Again, Beckett's intentions are as unnecessary 
here to claim a similarity between narrators as they were in claiming a difference between narrators, 
because the texts themselves repeatedly demonstrate the numerous affinities between the characters and 
their situations. There is a definite progression that links the Three Novels, requiring that they be read 
in their specific order to gain the full effect, an effect which would be lost if for example one began 
with Malone Dies, then read The Unnamable, then ended with Molloy. But if these novels are not 
linked by a single narrator, then what exactly is the connection? What process binds them together, 
however loosely? To fulfill my requirements, any such process would need to allow for Molloy and 
Moran as existing simultaneously, not require the presence of a single narrator, and hopefully provide 
some interpretation for the increasing chaos of The Unnamable. 
 I believe that the best way to understand the progression of the Three Novels is to view them as 
enacting the phenomenological method only to illustrate that method's failure, making the novels a 
reduction ad absurdum against Husserlian phenomenology. Although Husserl presents notorious 
difficulties, I will follow Husserl authority Dermot Moran in defining this method as consisting of three 
main steps, beginning with the bracketing motion of the epochē, a “putting into parentheses” of 
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existence, paired with the simultaneous reduction to the givenness of phenomena within that bracketed 
consciousness, which then uses eidetic variation to move from the particular instance to the universal 
through “the employment of imaginative variation” and ends with the “transcendental reduction” to 
pure consciousness, which is “the move to understand all objectivities as achievements or productions 
of transcendental subjectivity” (The Husserl Dictionary 108). Since Husserl often fails to provide strict 
descriptions of method, focusing instead on the intended results of those methods, I draw from his 
disciple Eugen Fink's Sixth Cartesian Meditation to describe the double motion of the epochē, pairing 
the bracketing of the world with Moran and the reduction to givenness with Molloy. Next, I quote from 
Husserl's Ideas 1 to show how Malone attempts and fails to enact eidetic variation through the stories 
of stand-in figures Sapo and Macmann. Finally, I claim that The Unnamable bears a strong 
resemblance to “the (in)famous paragraph 49 of Ideas 1” where Husserl contends that “it is possible to 
imagine the existence of a worldless subject, [but] it is not possible to imagine the existence of a 
subjectless world” (Zahavi 47). Husserl uses this experiment to argue that “the subject, the immanence, 
is absolute and autonomous since its manifestation only depends upon itself,” (Zahavi 48) but Beckett 
in The Unnamable shows that this proposed autonomy is a lie, since the subject must depend upon 
language to speak itself. Having broached the question of language, I argue that, at the same time the 
“progress” of the Three Novels corresponds to the phenomenological reductions, the failure of that 
progress corresponds to the movement of Derrida's initial critiques of Husserl, in which, as described 
by Leonard Lawlor in Derrida and Husserl, “the problem of the sign” comes to replace the “the 
problem of genesis,” (166) because the Three Novels follow a similar route, with Molloy highlighting 
the problem of origin and The Unnamable revealing the problem of language or the alterity of signs. To 
end this section, I argue that while Derrida accepts relationality and merely argues for reversing the 
current value system, Beckett's more radical goal is to break from that relationship entirely.  
 Before moving on, I'd like to describe how intentional I believe Beckett's satire in the Three 
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Novels of phenomenology was, and if he would have known enough of phenomenology from Sartre in 
order to satirize it. Beckett had read Descartes and I believe that he intentionally satirizes 
Occasionalism in Murphy. Beckett then extended Descartes's rational impulse to its limits in Watt, and 
since Wittgenstein does the same, Watt can be read through Wittgenstein without Beckett being familiar 
with the Tractatus. With Husserl, I would describe Beckett's satire as both intentional and intuitive. 
Beckett had enough of the basics of phenomenology from Sartre to intentionally target Husserl, and 
from there he intuited the rest. Sartre describes the initial step in phenomenology as a suspension of 
judgment that simultaneously reduces experience to its essential features, and phenomenology in 
general is conceived of by Sartre as the search for the ultimate transcendent essence of consciousness. 
Beckett was a genius for intuiting the problems of various philosophical system when he only had a 
summary knowledge of their basic tenets, and my argument is that he intentionally used the basics of 
phenomenology as given to him by Sartre to provide the target of his Three Novels, then intuited the 
problems of that system on his own while satirizing it. Most usefully, my reading of the Three Novels 
as a satire of phenomenology offers an explanation as to why there are so many noted congruencies 
between Beckett's thought and post-structuralism. Authors like Daniel Katz in Saying I No More and 
Thomas Trezise in Into the Breach: Samuel Beckett and the Ends of Literature begin their books by 
arguing that Beckett cannot be understood as a phenomenologist, but then argue that Beckett somehow 
embodies post-structural critiques of phenomenology. Both rely upon a vague notion of “textuality” to 
account for this correspondence, but I find such an argument unsatisfactory, and Derrida himself 
refuses to clarify whether or not this congruency can be explained by the fact that Beckett was a direct 
influence on him, with Derrida deferring the question of his parallels with Beckett by saying only that 
“this is an author to whom I feel very close, or to whom I would like to feel myself very close; but also 
too close ... I have perhaps avoided him a bit because of this identification” (as quoted, Katz, Saying I 
No More 5). My reading of Beckett as a satirist of phenomenology doesn't require that Beckett actually 
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believed in phenomenology as any sort of answer to cleaning up the mess, but it also provides a more 
realistic explanation for the many resemblances between The Unnamable and Derrida, since in my 
reading both intentionally critique phenomenology for its overlooking of the instability of language, 
rather than both somehow just ending up in the same place without explanation. 
A. General Affinities 
The subject doesn't matter, there is none. – Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable 
 Murphy's Cartesian mind was described in visual terms, a mixture of light and dark, but the 
medium for consciousness is language rather than images in the Three Novels, as Molloy says early on, 
claiming that his “sense of identity was wrapped in a namelessness hard to penetrate” and that all he 
knows “is what the words know” (Beckett, Three Novels 27). For that reason, we see Murphy and Watt, 
but only hear Molloy and the rest, and these figures speak from the I position. Murphy and Watt also 
contain visual references, Shandy-esque “typographical screams” (Beckett, Murphy 141) like the use of 
a ? to indicate the unknown in Watt, but these visual cues disappear in the Three Novels. This switch 
from the visual to the aural resulting in the move from the third-person to first-person perspective is 
key to my argument that Beckett was parodically inhabiting phenomenology in the Three Novels, 
because phenomenology rejects the abstract to describe lived experience, always starting, as already 
mentioned, “from the I” (Husserl 57). Another important reason why phenomenology rather than 
Descartes provides the best philosophical lens through which to examine these novels is that although 
the speakers all reject the possibility of any comprehensive understanding, as “for the whole there 
seems to be no spell,” (Beckett, Three Novels 23) they don't seem to doubt that they are actually 
experiencing what they experience. While impossible events increasingly occur, the texts never hint at 
the possibility of a Cartesian-style deceiver God, but instead force the reader to simply accept events as 
described, as do the speakers themselves. This tendency of the speakers to accept the givenness of their 
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experience, to withhold judgment and accept what is intuitively present rather than actively doubt that 
presence, according to Husserl in Ideas 1, Section 32, is the defining difference between his method 
and that of his precursor Descartes. No matter the absurdity of what they experience, the narrators rely 
on their basic intuition to assure themselves of the givenness of that experience, such as when Malone 
refuses to conclude that he is “prey to hallucinations” and in fact dead, because his “horse-sense tells 
[him] that [he] has not ceased to gasp”(Beckett, Three Novels 213). Each narrator, despite the chaos of 
their descriptions, also displays a predilection for final inventories and lists of laughably pedantic 
questions, aspiring to proceed in a formal manner similar to Husserl, with Moran distinguishing himself 
from the uncouth via his ability to “listen to the falsetto of reason,” (Beckett, Three Novels 102) Molloy 
claiming to see the world “in a way inordinately formal,” (Beckett, Three Novels 45) Malone describing 
himself as “scrupulous to the last, finical to a fault,” (Beckett, Three Novels 227) and the Unnamable 
finally realizing the futility of such formality and declaring that “what prevents the miracle is the spirit 
of method to which I have perhaps been a little too addicted” (Beckett, Three Novels 297). 
 Finally, while I would agree with Feldman's aforementioned claim that Beckett began to “write 
phenomenologically” in Watt, I believe that this can be demonstrated much more clearly in the Three 
Novels. What does it mean to write phenomenologically? In normal acts of perception, one only 
perceives discrete aspects or adumbrations of an object, and “the thing itself is never seen but appears 
across the endless series of [its] appearances” (Husserl 37). Those admubrations are then synthesized 
together through the ideality of the noema to produce the intended object, as “it is through synthesis 
that conscious experiences connect together into a unity ... when an identical object is grasped in the 
manifold of appearances” (Moran 313). Rather than focusing on that typical experience of synthesis 
which, as it functions properly, does not reveal the underlying means by which consciousness 
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constitutes the world with meaning, Sartre in Nausea13 and Beckett in Watt and the Three Novels both 
focus on moments when that synthesis breaks down, leaving only the pure hyle of sense perception 
without an intended sense. Feldman claims this first occurs in Watt, using an example from Arsene's 
early monologue, but in my opinion this appearance is still embryonic, because, unlike later in the 
Three Novels, the rendering of the breakdown of the noema is not described directly from the first-
person perspective, and it uses a visual metaphor rather than aural. Given the importance placed on the 
moment in Arsene's monologue cited by Feldman in Watt, I will quote excerpts of it at length: 
The change. In what did it consist? It is hard to say. Something slipped ... There I 
was warm and bright, smoking my tobacco-pipe, watching the warm bright wall, 
when suddenly somewhere some little thing slipped, some little tiny thing ... 
 
To conclude from this that the incident was internal would, I think, be rash. For 
my – how shall I say – my personal system was so distended at the period of 
which I speak that the distinction between what was inside it and what was 
outside it was not at all easy to draw. Everything that happened happened inside 
it, and at the same time everything that happened happened outside it ... 
 
The sun on the wall, since I was looking at the sun on the wall at the time, 
underwent an instantaneous and I venture to say radical change of appearance. It 
was the same sun and the same wall ... but so changed that I felt I had been 
transported, without my having remarked it, to some quite different yard, and to 
some quite different season, in an unfamiliar country. At the same time my 
tobacco-pipe, since I was not eating a banana, ceased so completely from the 
solace to which I was inured, that I took it from my mouth ... And my breast, in 
which I could almost feel the feathers stirring, in the charming way breast 
feathers have, relapsed into the void and bony concavity which my dear tutor 
used to say reminded him of Crecy ... 
 
It was then in my distress that I had the baseness to call to my aid recent 
costiveness and want of stomach. But in what did the change consist? What was 
changed, and how? What was changed, if my information was correct, was the 
sentiment that a change, other than a change of degree, had taken place. What 
was changed was existence off the ladder ... 
 
But how did this sentiment arise, that a change other than a change of degree had 
taken place? And to what reality did it correspond? ... I shall merely state, 
without enquiring how it came, or how it went, that in my opinion it was not an 
illusion, as long as it lasted, that presence of what did not exist, that presence 
                                                 
13 Beckett read Nausea before reading The Imagination. 
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without, that presence within, that presence between, though I'll be buggered if I 
can understand how it could have been anything else. (Beckett, Watt 43-46) 
 
  For Arsene, the change is indescribable because nothing external has changed, only Arsene's 
changing intention. I would argue that this reflects the bracketing gesture of the epochē, as only one's 
attention to experience changes in the bracketing while the experience itself stays the same. However, 
while the monologue is spoken from Arsene's I position, it is being reported to us from the distance of 
the third-person perspective, since Sam has yet to intrude upon the narrative, and the metaphor here is 
still visual, indicating that images might be the medium of consciousness rather than language. For 
these reasons, while I agree with Feldman that Beckett began writing phenomenologically in Watt, I 
believe this technique only reaches maturity in the Three Novels.  Also, this is the only example found 
in Watt that describes this breakdown, and those examples are much more frequent in the Three Novels. 
 As soon as Beckett begins writing in French, the metaphor turns from the visual to the aural, the 
disintegration of language rather than images, and since in the Three Novels14 consciousness is 
language, the breakdown of the noema, the bursting through of the senseless particular free of any ideal 
meaning, is much more drastic than in Watt. Moran, after being assigned the Molloy affair, describes 
“the noise of things bursting, merging, avoiding one another,” and as the typical synthesis of 
consciousness breaks down, he begins to “drown in the spray of phenomena” (Beckett, Three Novels 
106). Molloy's efforts at communication also fail due to the sensitivity of his ear, which turns words 
into “pure sounds, free of all meaning” and makes his own words resemble the inchoate “buzzing of an 
insect” (Beckett, Three Novels 45). Since the inside and outside are now linked, the inability to define 
the outside with words also indicates the inability of each speaker to define the interiority of their 
specific self, leading to a loss of identity. This breakdown is furthered by Malone, who claims that “the 
                                                 
14 Watt is concerned with language, but language is not said to be consciousness in Watt. As I've argued, there basically is 
no consciousness for any of the characters in Watt. 
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noises of the world, so various in themselves ... had been dinning at [him] so long as gradually to have 
merged into a single noise” which takes the form of “one vast continuous buzzing” (Beckett, Three 
Novels 201). By the time Worm arrives in The Unnamable, powerless to prevent the acts of perceiving 
which are forcing him to be, Worm's ear is reduced to “a transformer in which sound is turned, without 
the help of reason, to rage and terror” (Beckett, Three Novels 343). Lacking all identity, any 
subjectivity by which to project meaning, Worm can only receive meaning from the outside, but that 
reception from the outside gradually forces Worm to possess the attendant inside, trapped in relation to 
it. Having covered these broad congruencies, I would now like to turn to an examination of each 
specific novel. 
B. Molloy and the Simultaneity of the Bracketing Epochē and 
Phenomenological Reduction 
 
Yes it sometimes happens and will sometimes happen again that I forget who I 
am and strut before my eyes, like a stranger. Then I see the sky different from 
what it is and the earth too takes on false colors. It likes like rest, it is not ... – 
Samuel Beckett, Molloy 
 
 Key to my application of the phenomenological process to Beckett's Three Novels is that the 
initial step in that process consists of two simultaneous motions, which allows for the co-existence of 
Molloy and Moran. While in his later work Husserl does begin to “distinguish between epochē and 
reduction,” (Moran, The Husserl Dictionary 108) that distinction finds its fullest form in Eugen Fink's 
Sixth Cartesian Meditation, which Fink wrote under the influence of and in direct dialogue with 
Edmund Husserl, who provides his stamp of approval in the introduction and several footnotes. Fink 
defines the “double action of the phenomenological reduction” (29) as consisting of “two basic internal 
moments ... [the] transcendental epochē and reduction proper” (48). Those two simultaneous moments, 
the epochē and the reduction itself, are described by Ronald Bruzina in Edmund Husserl and Eugen 
Fink as  
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1. the abstention from belief applied to the whole of consciousness in the world 
to which reflection turns ... and 2. the recognition of the constitutedness of self-
conceptions about human being in the world as that through and beyond which 
one has to grasp in its own proper terms the transcendental subjectivity that is 
responsible for constitutive action and its constituted results. (100) 
 
Fink describes these two movements as internal to a single moment to avoid the problematic nature of 
any initial motivation for that movement, a problem he describes as “phenomenological foreknowing” 
(34). Put simply, the problem is that a subject cannot perceive that phenomena are produced 
subjectively in consciousness until they have performed the withholding of judgment that defines the 
epochē, but until they perform the epochē, they have no way of recognizing that essential givenness of 
phenomena, of knowing there is anything to bracket. In performing this double motion and escaping 
from all presuppositions, the phenomenologist departs from “the horizon of human possibilities” and 
then the “transcendental subjectivity, concealed in the self-objectivation as man, reflectively thinks 
about itself ... annulling itself as man” (Fink 32). The reduction “lays bare the transcendental onlooker,” 
who is “freed of the shrouding cover of the human being,” (Fink 40) a process by which “man un-
humanizes himself” (Bruzina 100). 
 Before receiving the Molloy assignment, Jacques Moran epitomizes the blind acceptance of the 
natural attitude. A man known chiefly by the rigidity of his “Sunday habits,” (Beckett, Three Novels 92) 
Moran's supercilious faith confines itself to issues of etiquette, such as whether it is proper to take 
communion after drinking beer. His relationship with his son consists solely in efforts to increase the 
bourgeoisie “horror of the body and its functions,” (Beckett, Three Novels 113) and his lone source of 
pleasure stems from caring for his hens and bees. The requirements of his job, which are left vague but 
hint at his participation in a network of espionage directed at incomprehensible targets, bring Moran the 
assignment to find Molloy, although the purpose of this assignment remains unknown. Once the 
messenger Gaber informs Moran of the task at hand and the existence of Molloy, whom I will soon link 
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to the reduction to givenness, Moran enacts the bracketing of the epochē, slowly letting go of all that 
holds him to the world. The knowledge of Molloy is described by Moran as “the poison I had just been 
given,” and as a result of that poison “the color and weight of the world were changing already,” 
(Beckett, Three Novels 92) a process which results in “a great confusion” (Beckett, Three Novels 93). 
The presence of Molloy punctures Moran's shallow acceptance of the world, and it is as if his life 
begins running out, though he does not immediately know “through what breach” (Beckett, Three 
Novels 97). 
 That knowledge of the subjective production of phenomena underlying existence only comes to 
Moran after his son abandons him during the failed search for Molloy, in the form of a voice that 
Moran says is “within me and exhorts me to continue to the end,” despite the fact that “it is a rather 
ambiguous voice and not always easy to follow” (Beckett, Three Novels 126). As Moran proceeds 
through the bracketing, however, that voice, the voice of the phenomenological other, becomes more 
distinct. As Husserl describes it in Ideas 1, the epochē requires the suspension of “every kind of 
cultural form, works of the technical and fine arts, of the sciences, and aesthetic and practical values,” 
and the same holds true for “the state, customs, law, religion” (104). Moran, stranded in the forest, 
receives a summons from Gaber to return home and make a report, and by the time Moran does so, 
enthralled to the voice of the other within himself, he has become unrecognizable, undergone “a 
frenzied collapsing of all that had always protected [him] from what [he] was always condemned to be” 
(Beckett, Three Novels 142). Despite that change, Moran has “a sharper and clearer sense of [his] 
identity than ever before,” (Beckett Three Novels 164) but he can no longer adopt the natural attitude, 
“no longer be bothered with the wretched trifles which had once been [his] delight” (Beckett, Three 
Novels 155). Moran accepts without emotion that in his absence his son has returned, his hens are dead 
and his bees are nothing but “a little dust of annulets and wings” (Beckett, Three Novels 169). Despite 
his previous delight in “the frivolous and charming world” (Beckett Three Novels 161) of religion, 
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Moran sends the priest away without speaking to him, sells his possessions and resolves to abandon his 
past life forever, a decision dictated to him by the voice of the phenomenological other, whose voice 
Moran now understands as having always been beneath his own, and which orders him to write the 
report that makes up the text at hand. 
 As most of the Moran section details the epochē and then ends with the emergence of the 
phenomenological onlooker, the Molloy section begins with a brief nod to that bracketed world, with 
Molloy claiming that he is living in his mother's room and that the person or people looking after him 
have asked him to write out his story, before focusing solely on the other emerging from within 
himself. As described by Fink, the phenomenological onlooker “does not stop exercising a belief in the 
world because he has never lived in belief in the world to begin with,” and he is characterized most by 
“the action of not joining in with, of not participating in world-belief” (42). Since Molloy as the 
phenomenological onlooker produces his own experience, his “region is vast;” he “has never left [its 
region] and ... never shall” (Beckett, Three Novels 60) because Molloy intends his world, projecting 
that region before himself, and can therefore never travel outside its bounds. Molloy frequently 
describes his otherness, his role as “a mere spectator,” (Beckett, Three Novels 32) as resulting from a 
preference for the depths, saying that “they are deep, my sorts, a deep ditch, and I am not often out of 
them” (Beckett, Three Novels 15). When confronted with society, Molloy's alterity shows how fully he 
has bracketed the social world, preventing him from adhering to even the most basic standards, as when 
a policeman asks Molloy for identification and Molloy presents him with the papers he uses to wipe 
himself. After being arrested, the resulting disturbance causes a distortion of Molloy's perception, with 
lawyers and policeman described as making “a dark, dark forms crowding in a dark place,” (Beckett, 
Three Novels 19) but Molloy's otherness proves to be his saving grace as “to apply the letter of the law 
to a creature like [Molloy] is not an easy matter” (Beckett, Three Novels 20). Ultimately Molloy 
withholds all judgment of the society that rejects him, believing that it was he “who was not natural 
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enough to enter into the order of things and appreciate its niceties,” (Beckett, Three Novels 39) and 
makes his way into the forest. While there, he undergoes an experience that bears a strong resemblance 
to the phenomenological reduction. 
 Left to his own devices, Molloy hears “the voice ... of a world collapsing endlessly, a frozen 
world” where he encounters “the indestructible chaos of timeless things” (Beckett, Three Novels 35). 
During this process, Molloy, having bracketed the world, reduces experience to the unchanging truth of 
essence, but his depiction of that essence is the exact opposite of that proposed by Husserl. Again, as 
with Descartes, the results are not just different than Husserl, they employ his method but end up with 
results 180 degrees away from what Husserl believes, indicating that there has to be an intentional 
reference in order for there to be such a perfect inversion. Rather than eternal truth or the stable 
bedrock of the self-evident, Molloy is told of “these wastes where true light never was, nor any upright 
thing, nor any true foundation” (Beckett, Three Novels 35). Molloy fears this voice but is powerless to 
stop it, describing it as “not a sound like other sounds, that you listen to when you choose,” but it is 
instead “with your head you hear it, not in your ears, you can't stop it” (Beckett, Three Novels 35). 
After listening to the voice of essence, a voice which Molloy perceives not as eternal truth but sinister 
chaos, Molloy says that he will sometimes forget who he as and “strut before his eyes like a stranger” 
and during that experience of total dissolution into the otherness of the ever-present onlooker he sees 
“the sky different from what it is and the earth too takes on false colors” a falsity that “looks like rest, 
[but] it is not” (Beckett, Three Novels 37). Here too the phenomenological reduction is satirized 
through the inversion of its results, as what looks like rest, resembling the surety of Husserlian 
apodictic certainty, is described as the most false, causing horror instead of certainty, which is the exact 
opposite of Husserl’s intended result. Lacking any escape route, sealed up in the jar of his otherness, 
Molloy can only ask himself “questions, one after the other, just for the sake of looking,” a process he 
calls “thinking,” (Beckett, Three Novels 44) and which prefigures the play of Malone. 
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C. Malone Dies as the Failure of Eidetic Variation 
Thus, if one loves paradoxical talk, one can actually say – and if one properly 
understands the ambiguous sense involved, one can say in strict truth – that “fiction” 
makes up the vital element of phenomenology. – Edmund Husserl, Ideas 1, Section 70 
 
 Having bracketed all questions of existence and reduced that existence to the givenness of 
phenomena, eidetic variation is then employed to move beyond the fact that “individual being of every 
kind is ... contingent” and could “in keeping with its essence be otherwise” (Husserl 10). As Dermot 
Moran describes this process, one “seeks to alter the constituent parts of the object ... [and] the essential 
features are those which cannot be varied” (The Husserl Dictionary 160). By placing “before its eyes 
pure occurrences of consciousness as exemplars,” (Husserl 119) eidetic variation then uses the 
imagination, the fiction spoken of by Husserl at the start of this section, to bring forth the unchangeable 
essence of that exemplar, “moving from the individual instance to the viewing of essence” (Moran, The 
Husserl Dictionary 160). In the same sense in which Husserl speaks of eidetic variation as “fiction,” 
Malone describes his own activity as “a game” that he plays, telling himself stories that are “neither 
beautiful nor ugly ... [but] calm ... almost lifeless” (Beckett, Three Novels 174). Espousing a desire for 
clarity, Malone wants “as little as possible of darkness” (Beckett, Three Novels 184). With the real 
world having receded further, Malone has no past, no identity, claiming only that his room seems to be 
his because he finds himself in it, but that the events of his previous life “have left no discernible trace 
on [his] mind” (Beckett, Three Novels 177). Realizing despite that lack of memory that he has “tried to 
live without knowing what [he] was trying,” (Beckett, Three Novels 189) Malone tells himself stories 
of a surrogate figure in an effort to pierce through the myriad forms “in which the unchanging seeks 
relief from its formlessness” (Beckett, Three Novels 192) and find the apodictic essence of himself. At 
times Malone denies that this figure, first called Sapo and then later Macmann, represents himself, such 
as when Malone claims that all he wants now “is to make a last effort to understand ... how such 
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creatures are possible,” (Beckett, Three Novels 193) but ultimately he recognizes that it is “a little 
creature in [his] image” (Beckett, Three Novels 219). 
 In the spirit of eidetic variation, Malone constantly changes the circumstances or attributes of 
Sapo/Macmann in a search for the essentials of both their existence and his own. Since no non-
contingent or essential attribute of being is found during that process, it can be summarized rather than 
detailed exhaustively. At first Sapo is described in context of his family life, in which his parents pin 
their vain hopes on Sapo's scholastic achievements, which are nonexistent, but Sapo flees from his 
inadequacy, indicating that family and the intellect are not essential attributes of himself. Sapo is next 
found in the country house of the butcher Big Lambert, but this change of domestic scene still leaves 
Sapo isolated, and he soon leaves human society entirely, preferring instead to crawl through the forest 
in a style reminiscent of Molloy and Moran. Malone then finds Sapo resting on a bench but with a 
much changed appearance, so Malone renames the figure Macmann, changes his name without any 
resulting effect. Showing that even sanity itself is inessential, Macmann is found next in a mental 
institution. Macmann briefly encounters love through his caretaker Moll, but she soon dies, replaced by 
the violent and erratic Lemuel, who fails to offer even the basics of companionship, leaving Macmann 
a solitary figure, devoid of love or friendship, who lacks any central feature upon which to base a solid 
definition of his ever-changing self. 
 Concurrent to Sapo becoming more like Malone, requiring the change into Macmann, Malone 
too undergoes this sifting process of eidetic variation in which parts of the self are removed, describing 
the feeling of “a blind and tired hand delving feebly in [his] particles and letting them trickle between 
its fingers,” and how this hand, angry at its ultimate inability to conjure a decisive gesture or find 
Malone's defining feature, “clutches, ransacks, ravages, avenging its failure to scatter [him] with one 
sweep” (Beckett, Three Novels 218). Near the end of the novel, Malone despairs of his efforts and 
describes how Macmann and the other mental patients, who resemble Murphy, Molloy and the rest of 
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the narrators of Beckett's early fiction, are led on a daytrip to an island by Lemuel and a supercilious 
woman named Lady Pedal. Once there Lemuel provides the elements for a destructively literal version 
of eidetic variation by chopping several of the inmates into pieces, never to be put back together. 
Having grown almost indistinguishable from Macmann, Malone himself ends by disappearing into his 
own story. Despite seeking to find the truth or essence of existence, he is instead left with only a 
“tangle of grey bodies,” (Beckett, Three Novels 280) abandoned to float with them forever in a ship of 
fools. All that is then left is to take the final step described in Malone's last lines, venturing to where 
there is “never anything there anymore,” (Beckett, Three Novels 281) to that presence beyond which 
there is nothing, the ultimate source of transcendental consciousness itself. 
D. “That there is no longer a world”: The Unnamable and Ideas 1 Section 49 
The entire spatiotemporal world is ... a merely intentional being. It is a being 
that consciousness posits in its experiences ... but beyond this is a nothing. – 
Edmund Husserl, Ideas 1, Section 49, “Absolute Consciousness as the Residue 
of Completely Nullifying the World” 
 
 In Section 49 of Ideas 1, entitled “Absolute consciousness as the residue of completely 
nullifying the world,” Husserl proposes that “the being of consciousness ... would necessarily be 
modified, to be sure, by nullifying the world of things, but would not be affected in its own existence” 
(89). Husserl admits that such an experience would be “teeming with irresolvable conflicts,” having 
lost “the fixed, regular order,” but the immanence of consciousness undeniably survives this strange 
situation in which “there is no longer a world,” (88) proving that world to be “utterly dependent upon 
consciousness,” (89) and that consciousness to be “absolute and independent of all being” (Moran, The 
Husserl Dictionary 41). Since consciousness is the means by which experience occurs, consciousness 
itself, “considered in purity, has to hold as a connection of being that is, for itself, closed off,” and the 
“phenomenological residue” (Husserl 90) of transcendental consciousness survives all reduction. As the 
mode of experience, the precondition that makes experience possible, the ego can never experience 
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itself in the present. The search for any experience not constituted by an experiencing ego is doomed to 
fail, the hope for any “beyond this” reduced to “a nothing” (Husserl 90). 
 While there is no evidence of Beckett reading Section 49 of Ideas 1, The Unnamable is eerily 
similar to Husserl's thought experiment, as both imagine an attempt to reach ultimate consciousness by 
subtracting the physical world, even as both acknowledge the impossibility of their efforts. If Husserl's 
process had been working successfully throughout the course of the novels, this comparison of The 
Unnamable to Ideas 1, Section 49 would be wholly adequate to explain the chaos of The Unnamable. 
After all, as quoted above, Husserl admits that this nullified world would result in an experience 
“teeming in irresolvable conflicts,” and the Unnamable certainly encounters such conflicts, forced to 
proceed “by aporia pure and simple” (Beckett, Three Novels 285). However, the comparison between 
Beckett's Three Novels and phenomenology breaks down here because the chaos described is not the 
chaos of the perceived world (although that world is chaotic, full of oscillating figures and detached 
voices), but instead the chaos of the perceiving self, which, though “unbelieving,” must still call itself 
“I,” (Beckett, Three Novels 285) and due to that lack of belief can no longer maintain the fiction of a 
pure, coherent presence, a presence that forms the basis for Husserl's entire method, one which for him 
is absolutely unquestionable. In Husserl's notion, the I might be “indescribable”, (154) but it is fully 
itself, with no exterior presence involved. As The Unnamable proceeds, however, it becomes clear that 
language, the medium of consciousness, introduces into the subject that very exteriority which Husserl 
denies, since it is inextricable from consciousness, the means by which presence both states itself and 
makes itself known to itself.  As its speech proceeds, the Unnamable describes itself not only as an I, 
but also a you and a he, and that slippage across pronouns indicates a division within self-presence for 
which Husserl cannot account. To describe the chaos of that self, a chaos stemming from its 
constitution through the shifting medium of language, a chaos that eliminates any possibility of 
phenomenology finding the apodictic essence sought, I will now turn to Derrida's critique of Husserl in 
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Voice and Phenomenon. 
E. Derrida and Beckett: The Problem of Origin and the Alterity of Signs 
Can one be ephectic otherwise than unawares? – Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable 
 The reason why the essence of consciousness can never be reached in The Unnamable is that it 
can never be expressed through language, and this focus on the inability of language to express essence 
is shared by Derrida, which makes it necessary to briefly summarize Derrida's early philosophy before 
exploring the similarities and differences between Derrida's position and Beckett's, with the main 
difference being that although Derrida claims that relationality makes absolute meaning impossible, 
Derrida also accepts the resulting impurity of meaning, while Beckett, as shown in the letter to Duthuit, 
wants to do away with relationality entirely. In his 1953/54 philosophical dissertation The Problem of 
Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy, Derrida takes up the problem described by Fink as phenomenological 
foreknowing, which is that phenomenology, designed to be free of all suppositions, actually supposes 
itself. Since the noema is irreell, its “constituting is always preceded by a constituted,” (Lawlor 81) it is 
therefore impossible to “eliminate the already constituted” (Lawlor 47) and determine the origin of that 
constituted sense, to disentangle morphe from hyle, interior from exterior, etc., as Husserl mistakenly 
believes, because “all oppositions necessarily contaminate each other” (Lawlor 88). I believe this to be 
an accurate criticism of Husserl, and one that can be applied to Ideas 1 Section 49 when Husserl claims 
the primacy of transcendental consciousness over the world, an opposition that in theory involves two 
separate terms, but Husserl admits beforehand that these terms are in experience always intertwined, so 
his thought experiment falls prey to the very metaphysics he attempts to avoid, since metaphysics is 
“speculation without evidence or intuition” (Lawlor 82). Having detailed Husserl's problems with 
origin, Derrida in Voice and Phenomenon moves onto the cause of that problem: that the medium of the 
always-already-constituted noematic sense, the medium of consciousness itself, language, auto-
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affection, the voice, can never have a pure beginning or attain full presence in the originarily repetitive 
realm of signs. 
 For Husserl in Ideas 1, under the influence of Frege, the essence of language is logical 
expression, and “univocal terms [are] needed for essence ... words fitted with distinct and singular 
meanings” (120). In Husserl's conception of language, any intended sense, any Bedeutung, can be 
understood free from context due to its logical connection with the expressed sense. Husserl realizes 
that all instances of actual communication require some loss or distortion of that meaning, so he 
distinguishes between two forms of language use, between indication and expression, and claims that in 
the interior monologue of auto-affection, the intended meaning is always completely present, perfectly 
expressed rather than imperfectly indicated.  Indication is “the need for signs,” (Derrida 36) but for 
Husserl those signs attain transparency in interior expression because “the certainty of internal 
existence has no need ... of being signified” as it is “immediately present” (Derrida 37). This immediate 
presence of meaning in interior consciousness, the lack of alterity or otherness, allows Husserl to claim 
that indication has no role in auto-affection, that voice as consciousness is a medium of pure 
expression. 
 However in Derrida's conception of language, which stems from Ferdinand de Saussure rather 
than Gottlob Frege, terms are presented negatively rather than positively. As de Saussure says of the 
self-enclosed linguistic system, “there are only differences without positive terms” (Course in General 
Linguistics 120). Rather than being able to distinguish the value of positive terms without reference to 
each other, x and y, signs in de Saussure's conception only present meaning negatively, x can only be 
understood as -(y), and rather than the immediate presence of x=y, there is only the substituted non-
presence of -(x)=-(y), so that the actual terms never appear. Furthermore, the constituting of presence 
through signs requires that this presence can never be a singular event, can only indicate the already 
known, as “a sign that would take place only once would not be a sign” (Derrida 42). Derrida then uses 
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the “originarily repetitive structure” of the sign to demonstrate that language itself introduces alterity 
and otherness into the sameness of auto-affection, declaring as a result that “there is no sure criterion 
by means of which to distinguish between an external and internal language” (Derrida 48). There is 
always a trace of indication, of alterity, in each present expression, which means that the particular can 
never be reached. Consciousness is language, language is alterity, and consciousness therefore can 
never be wholly identical to itself, is always re-presented but never presented, resulting in “the identity 
of identity and non-identity within the same” (Derrida 59). 
 Derrida then argues that since alterity is the precondition for sameness and the supplementarity 
of the trace precedes all constituted meaning, the governing force of meaning in language is differánce, 
“the operation of differing that, at once, splits and delays presence” (Derrida 75). As we have seen 
through de Saussure, presence in language is always delayed, and due to Husserl's conception of time 
as including the non-perception of retention, self-presence is always different from itself. For Husserl, 
there is no discrete, punctual now. Instead each now, each simultaneity includes the just-ahead of 
protention and the just-past of retention. The diaphaneity of signs in Husserlian expression requires that 
meaning be instantly available, perceived in the blink of an eye. Yet, as should be obvious, once 
Husserl conceives of the now as a duration, as including the thickness of retention and protention, such 
immediacy becomes impossible; “there is a duration to the blink ... and it closes the eye” (Derrida 56). 
To appear to itself, presence must first always be different from itself, “differentiated into receiver and 
creator, hearer and speaker,” (Lawlor 194) and “the same is the same only by affecting itself with an 
other, by becoming the other of the same” (Derrida 73). The I can never realize itself in the present, but 
only by grasping itself as a you. Since any consciousness of that you can only be realized through the 
repetition of alterior signs, through language, voice can never provide a medium for the simultaneous, 
univocal expression of essence, and as a result “we are beyond absolute knowledge” (Derrida 88). Even 
the experience of silence itself is kept by the voice, must be translated into signs in order to be 
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consciously perceived, and the voice, the medium for naming, is itself “the unnamable” (Derrida 66). 
 Using these concepts from Derrida (the contamination of supposed oppositions, language as 
alterity or non-presence, the ineradicable trace of otherness within the same), it is now possible to 
understand exactly why phenomenological efforts are depicted as always failing throughout the Three 
Novels, why those efforts are satirized rather than endorsed. The question of whether or not the 
narrators of all three novels are the same, whether Murphy turns into Moran turns into Molloy, etc., can 
now be summarily dispatched. Are the speakers the same? There is no same, only a mixture of 
sameness and difference, as indicated even by their names, which all begin with an M but are different 
thereafter. As Derrida began by focusing on the problem of origin in Husserl, how his binaries 
presuppose each other and therefore an origin can be ascribed to neither, so too does Molloy constantly 
highlight the problem of Molloy's origin. If the first part of the problem of phenomenological 
foreknowledge is that one can't bracket the world until one knows of the underlying production of 
phenomena by the subject, then Gaber's message solves that problem for Moran, even as it 
contaminates him. But what possible cause could be ascribed to Molloy himself? How could he bracket 
a world he was never in to begin with? Molloy presents himself as always already other, outside of 
typical existence, but then there can be no explanation for how his strange presence came to be found 
within that existence. This problem of Molloy's origin is highlighted in the opening three lines of the 
text: “I am in my mother's room. It's I who live here now. I don't know how I got here” (Beckett, Three 
Novels 3). Molloy immediately cannot explain how he came to be, and his mother, the source from 
which he came, is absent. His search for her throughout the rest of the story highlights the need for the 
possible explanation of origin she might bring, but her continued absence only highlights the lack of 
answers provided, and this lack of origin continues through Malone Dies, who also doesn't know how 
he came to possess his room, and The Unnamable, whose speaker assigns himself a beginning “only for 
the sake of clarity” (Beckett, Three Novels 289). 
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 As for Malone Dies, it should be clear that the reason Malone cannot find any essential aspect 
of himself or Sapo/Macmann is that there is no such central aspect, since essence is impossible in 
language. The ending of Malone Dies, when Malone attempts to disappear into words, can now be 
understood via the conception of signs as infinitely iterable and yet never fully present, the usage of 
which requires the acceptance of death through the absence of the speaker. By achieving apotheosis and 
transforming himself into signs, Malone creates his own absence, but only by translating his presence 
into the partial form of language, so that his incomplete presence can still be reactivated by any reader 
of that language. As pure voice free of signs, Malone would be at once “both absolutely alive and 
absolutely dead,” (Derrida 88) but having translated that voice into language, he can be neither. Malone 
dies but doesn't die, pulled back from the grave each time his words are read. 
 In The Unnamable, in what I would describe as an instance of convergent evolution, with both 
recognizing the gap in Husserl's logic and adapting accordingly, Beckett demonstrates several affinities 
to Derrida, but I believe, in contrast to Beckett's frequent adoption by post-structuralists, that Beckett 
actually surpasses Derrida in his rejection of meaning. The main reason for the consistent application of 
Derrida to The Unnamable, why it is almost unavoidable, is that the Unnamable refers to himself not 
only as the pure now of an I, but also as the you of retention, with the self as a compound of those two, 
an I/you rather than pure I, and as I have shown this is Derrida's exact argument against pure self-
presence in Voice and Phenomenon. To achieve that pure self-presence, the Unnamable would have to 
speak and hear himself simultaneously, to have interior language become transparent as described by 
Husserl. Instead, the impossibility of simultaneously sending and receiving words results in an 
“infinitesimal lag between arrival and departure” (Beckett, Three Novels 343) of the saying of I, so that 
no single “name ... no pronoun” (Beckett, Three Novels 393) is adequate to describe the speaker's 
identity. The self as grasped through language is always already other, which is why the pronouns used 
by the Unnamable to refer to himself shift between I, you, and even he, with none of these providing 
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any adequation between language and the speaker's self. 
 Richard Begam argues in Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity that The Unnamable can be 
divided into thirds, with the first section dedicated to the presence of Mahood, the second section to the 
absence of Worm, and the aporetic welter of the final third as a “brilliant exercise in differánce” (175) 
in which the speaker moves in and between those two binaries, refusing to align himself with either. 
The speaker of The Unnamable has a “pensum to discharge,” (Beckett, Three Novels 304) to achieve 
either total presence or absence through speaking, but I would argue that only the first third, the failure 
of the attempt to achieve total presence, truly aligns with Derrida. The Unnamable speaks in this 
section of another M character named Mahood, and this figure is linked with having a presence, a 
distinct individuality and personal history. The Unnamable initially claims that his task will be 
complete when he accepts the identity of Mahood, to admit “that [he] is someone” (Beckett, Three 
Novels 403) and achieve full presence, and the impossibility of that task in my opinion recapitulates 
Derrida's critique of Husserl, that if the particular can only be grasped through the general term, then 
that presence cannot ever be whole. However, I would argue that in the next two-thirds, Beckett 
surpasses Derrida by attempting to do away with relationality entirely. The next figure, Worm, begins 
as full absence rather than full presence, and then has identity impressed upon it from outside, with acts 
of perception creating the subject that intends them rather than the subject intending the act, as seen 
with Mahood and all previous characters.  
 By including Worm as the binary to Mahood, Beckett's critique of intentionality goes beyond 
Derrida. While Derrida continuously criticizes Western thought for overvaluing presence, he doesn't 
ultimately deny the existence of presence, with deconstruction meant more as an effort to balance the 
historical scales rather than placing any intrinsic value on absence. Beckett, on the other hand, is not 
trying to achieve a more accurate acknowledgement of the nature of relationality, he is trying to erase 
“the state of being in relation to” entirely. Derrida, despite his many critics, does not deny that meaning 
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is possible, but only believes it to be fluid, because particulars can never be fully expressed by the 
general or ideal terms of the noematic sense as constituted by language. Mahood shows that the 
particulars of his identity can't be grasped, but Worm takes the critique further to show that any 
absolute absence is always unreachable as well. Just as the general ruins the particular, so too does the 
particular ruin the general, and the task of the speaker in the final third shifts from the task of saying 
himself to the task of saying the nothingness that is himself, “to speak and yet say nothing,” an attempt 
which always fails, “overlook[ing] something, a little yes, a little no” (Beckett, Three Novels 297). In 
Voice and Phenomenon, Derrida focuses only on the impossibility of pure presence, but Beckett 
displays the impossibility of both pure presence and pure absence, of reaching either a pure inside or 
outside, instead of accepting the mixture of the two as Derrida does.  
 Trapped in language and therefore lacking any absolute meaning, the Unnamable must inhabit a 
third term that is “neither inside nor outside, but a partition ... that belongs to neither” (Begam 177). 
Unable to achieve either task of becoming pure presence or pure absence in language/consciousness, 
the speaker declares that he must be neither inside nor outside, but “the thing that divides the world in 
two ... the partition ... the tympanum” (Beckett, Three Novels 376). Since the Unnamable can only be 
“this dust of words, with no ground for their settling,” (Beckett, Three Novels 379) he must never arrive 
anywhere, because language never arrives anywhere, the signified always delayed, so that he can only 
“go on squirming for ever at the end of the line” (Beckett, Three Novels 332). Derrida denies the 
possibility of complete affirmation, but not meaning as a whole. The final problem of The Unnamable 
is not just the denial of affirmation, but the impossible goal of denying denial itself. This act of total 
denial, remaining inside it rather than being exterior to it, is impossible for two reasons. First, if 
consciousness is intentionality, it is always in relation to, and therefore to be conscious of its denial is 
to be in relation to it. Second, absolute denial is impossible in language, since one must reference what 
one denies in order to negate it. This necessity of calling forth that which one means to deny means that 
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there is always a remaining trace that can never be fully erased, since each effort at erasure only adds to 
the mess, pushes the Unnamable further away from “the peace where he neither is, nor is not, and 
where the language dies that permits of such expressions” (Beckett, Three Novels 328). The x in -(x) 
might be negated or delayed, but the trace of its presence always remains. The unstated answer to the 
opening question of “Can one be ephectic otherwise than unawares?” (Beckett, Three Novels 285) is 
“No,” and since one can't do something without being aware of it, one cannot ever truly be ephectic, to 
lack knowledge of their lack of knowledge. As soon as that lack of knowledge is recognized, it is 
destroyed. When the Unnamable tries to reach absence through language, he must as a result always 
conjure that which he means to deny, or, to put it most simply, become trapped in the conundrum that 
“the Unnamable” is itself still a name. 
V. Forensics, Brief Conclusion 
The essential is never to arrive anywhere, never to be anywhere. – Samuel 
Beckett, Malone Dies 
 
 To conclude, I'd like to demonstrate how the form of each novel demonstrates the philosophical 
framework I've applied to it, then address a few possible objections to my argument. In arguing that 
philosophy has determined the structure of these five novels, I would hope it would by now be clear 
that I am not arguing that Beckett is adopting those philosophical positions, as he has none. Beckett's 
impossible method of failure, similar to Democritus, is that of inhabiting not to endorse but to expose, 
attempting to be in but not of. However, one must still understand the reference point in order to 
understand the parody, which means that one must also recognize the parallels I have enumerated or am 
about to enumerate in order to fully understand the satire. Since I have already glossed over the 
thematic parallels of Beckett's early fiction to philosophy, the structural parallels, due to Beckett's 
merging of form and content, should be apparent without more philosophical explication. 
 As I've shown, Murphy is 13 chapters, and those chapters recapitulate the Cartesian mind/body 
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divide by alternating between Murphy or mind-centric chapters and Celia or world-centric chapters. 
The novel itself is divided between the body and the mind through its structure. Watt consists of four 
sections, indicating some logical separation of parts, a coherent system.15 However, the chaos of the 
addenda shows that this seeming logicality is nothing but a lie, with the structure of Watt then 
displaying the inadequacy of its own organizational system. Molloy is in two parts because the epochē 
and phenomenological reduction problematically require two separate but simultaneous actions, and 
Molloy highlights the problematic nature of that simultaneity by having the Molloy section precede the 
Moran section when any linear chronology would place Moran at the start, as Moran is clearly closer to 
our world at the beginning of his story, and with this intentional disruption of the expected chronology 
only highlighting the problematic origin of the characters. Neither Malone Dies nor The Unnamable is 
divided into parts, and that is because once existence has been bracketed, all experience is recognized 
as a production of the voice and is therefore undifferentiated, can no longer be distinguished into 
separate entities. While the sentences and paragraphs are relatively short and orderly in Murphy, Watt 
and Molloy, and the movement between Malone and Sapo provides the paragraphs of Malone Dies with 
the limits necessary to retain a similarly coherent form, the reduction to the all-encompassing medium 
of voice in The Unnamable means that its paragraphs and sentences lose all shape, extending beyond 
the ability of these meaning-giving units to give form to the voice that flows through them. In The 
Unnamable, the chaos takes over the form itself, and the extreme length of the sentences and 
paragraphs means that they lose any absolute meaning, can no longer be grasped in their entirety, just 
as the Unnamable cannot say itself in a single phrase. 
 The vocabulary of each novel also parallels the different philosophies they parody, employing 
each philosophy's unique conception of meaning only to show the flaws of each system. For Descartes, 
                                                 
15 The obvious symbolic move here would be to link each of the four parts to the 4 steps in Descartes' method. However, 
there is not enough difference between sections to provide evidence for such an argument in my opinion, since all of the 
Descartes' steps occur in all of Watt's parts, and can't be uniquely tied to any of them. 
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meaning is essential, self-evident free from all context, and functions through a one-to-one 
correspondence. This is shown in Murphy's absurdly specialized vocabulary and heightened diction, 
which I believe to be its most distinctive linguistic feature. Murphy is always searching for the hapax 
legomenon, the word that perfectly expresses the singular nature of each instance, such as Neary's 
description of Murphy as “that long hank of Apollonian asthenia ... that schizoidal spasmophile,” (31) 
amongst countless examples. Such language comically demonstrates that to so obscurely express the 
particular is to sacrifice the reference to the general by which communication takes place, making the 
whole effort self-defeating. In Wittgenstein, language must be broken down to “simples,” and Watt 
reflects this by employing the opposite tactic as Murphy and focusing on lists of basic, one-syllable 
names of simple objects, such as how “sat,” “knelt,” “bed,” “fire,” and “door” were used in reference to 
the movements of Mr. Knott in the excerpt quoted in the Watt section of this argument, but these lists 
lose all complexity by focusing only on such simple elements, pinning down inessentials while the 
subject escapes entirely. In Husserlian phenomenology, language gains incomplete meaning through 
use in indication, but has no meaning whatsoever in interior expression because it becomes transparent. 
Once that interior is contaminated with the exterior, as it is in Beckett and Derrida, then repetition is the 
only vehicle by which to attach meaning to a word, but each application of that general term to a new 
particular changes that meaning by increasing it. The failure of repetition to provide a stable basis for 
linguistic meaning is demonstrated at the end of The Unnamable, when a few specific words are 
increasingly repeated, but only to show their inability to capture that which they are meant to represent. 
As shown in the figures below, in which Molloy spans from roughly 1-3.5, Malone Dies from 3.5 to 
7.5, and The Unnamable from 7.5-10, with the final third from 9-10, the more the Unnamable wants to 
not say words so that he can not know anything and become silence, the more he must participate in 
that which he means to deny, pushing further away that which he desires most.  
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Fig. 1 “Say”     Fig. 2 “Know”   Fig. 3 “Silence” 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
As demonstrated by these figures, the word “say” doubles in usage (from an average rate of 50 
uses per decile to a rate of 98) as the speaker tries to not say anything, and when the speaker wants to 
not know anything, the word “know” increases from a low point in Malone Dies of 36 uses per decile 
to a rate of 140 uses per decile. “Silence,” which I would argue is “the keyword to the whole business,” 
(Beckett, Three Novels 362) skyrockets from a rate of roughly 10 uses per decile to a rate of 60 uses per 
decile. “Silence” best embodies the conundrum of repetition as meaning, how it pushes its object away 
with each attempt at grasping, because the saying of “silence” can itself never be silent. The vehicle of 
delivery, language, automatically makes unavailable the arrival of the desired object, a word for 
“silence” that incarnates silence itself.  
 If the meaning of the word “silence” stems from accumulation of use rather than essence or 
logic, then each time the Unnamable says “silence,” the meaning of “silence” increases, and the more 
often the Unnamable says “silence,” the faster the rate of change. In the first utterance of “silence,” the 
Unnamable uses it to refer in the typical fashion to “silence” as the absence of sound, saying that 
“though the silence here is almost unbroken, it is not completely so” (Beckett, Three Novels 289). As 
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the Unnamable's monologue proceeds, however, the meaning of “silence” changes to represent not only 
the lack of sound but also the lack of being, since being as language is an aural phenomenon. Unable to 
reach either the pure presence of sound or the pure absence of sound, to determine whether he is 
“words among words or silence in the midst of silence,” (Beckett, Three Novels 382) the Unnamable 
keeps repeating the word “silence” in an attempt to invoke its nothingness, but that increased repetition 
only pushes his goal further away, and “the real silence” (Beckett, Three Novels 401) can never be said, 
its nothingness never reached. Since the Unnamable is “made of silence” (Beckett, Three Novels 406) 
but bears the task of “say[ing] words until they find [him], until they say [him],” (Beckett, Three 
Novels 407) that task can never end, because the Unnamable can never succeed in his goal.  
 Reminiscent of Derrida's notion of differánce, the possibility of “silence” as signifying non-
being is only made possible because language is an unstable medium, since that change in signification 
requires the change of “silence” from initially indicating a lack of sound to “silence” as indicating a 
lack of presence, but the very malleability that makes it possible for “silence” to change from 
representing a lack of sound to representing a lack of being also makes it impossible for the meaning of 
“silence” to remain stable enough to reach the desired state of total representation. Instead of ending 
with the incarnation of presence or absence, the Unnamable's reliance upon language means that he 
automatically fails, since language cannot incarnate absolutes, and as a result his speech will always 
keep going “on.”  
 Or does it? Most readings of the famous final lines of The Unnamable, “You can't go on. I must 
go on. I'll go on,” view this as an endlessly repeating final point. The repetition of this last formula 
could be thought of in mathematical terms, (you can't go on X I must go on X I'll go on)♦∞, with the 
reduction to logical form insuring the stability of meaning, but only via the total erasure of the 
particular. Alternatively, to avoid erasing the particular, one could also conceive of this formula as 
actually repeating without end: “You can't go on, I must go on, I'll go on; You can't go on, I must go on, 
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I'll go on ... ad infinitium.” This would preserve each individual word, but the infinite repetition would 
eventually detach all logical meaning from their usage, leaving only the mantra of the senseless 
particulars. 
 However, I believe that it's possible to use the meta to arrive at a different reading of this ending 
formula, one that also allows for a final statement on Beckett's relationship to philosophy as a whole. 
Although I have ignored any discussion of the meta up to this point, in many critical readings16, the I of 
The Unnamable is eventually read as Beckett's own, describing himself sitting in a room writing the 
story of him writing that story, only to display the limits of storytelling. I have previously left out this 
meta level of Beckett's fiction as this reading does little to disturb my interpretation, since I would 
counter that adding in Beckett as another speaker only serves to further highlight that the all-
encompassing medium of the voice consumes any particularity it expresses. If there is no sameness to 
identity, then the possible presence of “Samuel Beckett” in The Unnamable is only the final example 
that nothing escapes the generalizing contamination of the voice, because “Samuel Beckett” is as much 
of a fiction as Molloy and all the rest. However, rather than reading “You can't go on. I must go on. I'll 
go on,” as an unending repetition, either logical or literal, I'd argue that an appeal to the meta allows 
one to recognize the very real fact that The Unnamable does indeed end, as all novels end, in the white 
space of the page that follows the final punctuation mark. Despite all of the speakers' efforts, all their 
“college quips” (Beckett, Three Novels 342) about being and existence, the silence of that white page 
waits for them (and us) at the end, and every word they utter is a mere diversion from that unsayable 
inevitability. The greatest irony of “You can't go on. I must go on. I'll go on,” might just be the rather 
uncomplicated fact that it is at precisely this point that the novel ends, so that the decision is erased as 
soon as it’s made.  
 Why does that irony matter? I believe that this juxtaposition of a voice claiming it must go on 
                                                 
16 Kenner, for example, in the chapter “The Man in the Room” in Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study 
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just as it finally is silenced serves to highlight the powerlessness of the voice itself, and shows how 
Beckett is satirizing the possibilities soon to be offered by post-structuralism as much as he satirized 
Descartes and phenomenology. The mistake of post-structuralists is to think that since what I have 
argued is Beckett's satire of phenomenology resembles post-structural critiques of Husserl, Beckett's 
own stance resembles a type of proto-post-structuralism. I would argue, however, that Beckett satirizes 
the future position of post-structuralism as much as he does Descartes and phenomenology, as shown 
by the devastating erasure of voice enacted by the white space of the end of The Unnamable. The 
imposition of the void upon the Unnamable's monologue renders all of its components meaningless, 
including the post-structural realization that he is “made of words.” As with the rest of philosophy, this 
realization of the Unnamable's dependency upon language to compose himself is shown to be useless, 
since it does nothing to either dispel or hasten the oncoming void, which proceeds unscathed by all 
attempts to influence it through language. Instead of offering some final truth that explains Beckett, the 
post-structural highlighting of Beckett's portrayals of the instability of language is only another tactic 
of “loathsome combat” like all the rest. Beckett's renunciation was so total that he was able to renounce 
not only the philosophy of the past and present, but also the philosophy of the near future.  
 Derrida, perhaps recognizing that Beckett is always satirizing rather than endorsing, refused to 
offer any statement on Beckett and thereby avoids the mistakes of those like Trezise and Katz who 
claim Beckett as one of their own, but in doing so Derrida provides absolutely nothing of value by way 
of approaching Beckett.  As a final way of understanding Beckett's early fiction as a whole, and without 
resorting to claiming Beckett as a philosopher, as most critics do, while still at least saying something, 
as Derrida fails to do, I would argue that the only ultimate judgment delivered on philosophy as 
expressed throughout these five novels, but particularly at the end of The Unnamable, is that 
philosophy merely provides us with something amusing to say as the white space of nullity approaches 
to do away with all of our efforts to say it. I recognize that this is not the most complicated statement, 
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and as I said at the introduction, the tendency to complicate is normally one of literary criticism's 
greatest strengths, but Beckett turns that strength into a weakness, dares the critic to remove the 
intricacies of their armor and stand defenseless before the void. 
 The white space at the end of The Unnamable could be seen as the fulfillment of the 
Unnamable's impossible goal to say “silence” itself, but it can only be seen and not said, because 
language is always contaminated by the very relationality from which Beckett seeks to escape. If The 
Unnamable's monologue ends with the leap to the transcendent level of the visual, then that 
transcendence requires total erasure to reach the blankness which is the incarnation of silence itself. 
The only language that can represent the nothingness Beckett seeks is the visible absence of language, 
and, in a final paradox and joke, the white space at the end of The Unnamable leaves us with the last 
revelation that the fullest embodiment of Beckett's writing, the only writing that can meet his 
impossible demands, is no writing at all. 
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